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1. Introduction 
The project Engaging with Uncertainty and Risk in Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation: 
delivering safety and innovation was funded jointly by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) and Syngenta. It focused on the EU regulatory process for assessment of 
the environmental risks associated with the introduction of GM crops in the European 
Union. A full description of the aims, methods and results is included in Annex 1. This 
paper summarises the background analysis conducted by Innogen along with the 
research outcomes, and proposes a new approach to governance and engagement in 
relation to innovation for agricultural biotechnologies in the EU. 
1.1 The Policy Gap 
A starting point for this project was the identification by Syngenta staff of a ‘risk 
assessment-policy gap’ in the regulation of GM crops in the EU. Such a gap was 
discussed by Evans et al. (2006) in the context of the UK contaminated land regime. This 
gap is related to the absence of operational definitions of environmental protection goals 
on the basis of which risk assessors can determine when an endpoint has been reached 
that satisfies the regulator’s requirements for a low probability of harm (Garcia-Alonso and 
Raybould, 2013). Dealing with the gap would require a political debate to set out societal 
goals, regulatory guidance to determine application and a legal debate to establish 
precedence. Ensuring stakeholder input during problem formulation to achieve consensus 
on risk management goals and to improve accountability is suggested as a means to 
mitigate this gap, although Evans et al. recognise that citizens are not always in 
agreement over risk management objectives and indeed there can be substantial 
disagreement even among ‘pro-environment’ groups. Ambiguous policy statements are 
thus in many cases accurate representations of societal objectives.  
Raybould and Poppy (2012) have proposed that this gap explains why accumulating 
ecological research showing negligible environmental risks from the use of GM crops has 
failed to expedite regulatory decisions about cultivation approvals for these crops in the 
EU. However, identification of the nature and causes of a policy gap is not necessarily a 
prelude to closure of that gap. If, as Evans et al. (2006) claim, societal consensus is a 
necessary prerequisite to the definition of clear operationally defined policy objectives, 
and thence to regulatory decisions based on scientific evidence, the European regulatory 
system for GM crops may remain in its current unsatisfactory state for the foreseeable 
future (IRGC, 2009). Indeed ambiguity surrounding policy objectives seems increasingly 
to be the norm across a wide range of policy fields, particularly in the EU.  
New risk governance and regulatory approaches will be required if the EU is to retain a 
role in the development of a wide range of technologies that will be part of the global bio-
economy in the coming century. These new systems will need to be better adapted to the 
opportunities presented by 21st century science, and to be robust, flexible and democratic 
in the face of societal pressures while continuing to ensure safety for people and the 
environment.  
1.2. Engaging with Uncertainty and Risk in Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation 
Innogen research has covered these issues from the perspectives of policy and 
innovation interactions in the development of GM crops (Tait and Chataway, 2007; 
Chataway et al., 2008; Tait, 2009b; Tait and Barker, 2011), and of synthetic biology (Tait, 
2009a; Lowrie and Tait, 2011; Tait, 2012). Castle’s recent work on herbicide tolerant 
canola in Canada has also helped to reduce the uncertainty around the agricultural and 
environmental benefits of adopting these crops, creating space for clearer policy 
questions (Gusta et al., 2011; Smyth et al., 2011). 
Underlying themes in all these studies are the treatment of uncertainty in debates about 
agricultural technologies, and related questions about the role of scientific expertise 
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relative to lay judgements in policy decision making. Collins (2008) and Collins et al , 
(2010) have distinguished between the role of scientific expertise in policy making and 
that of non-expert citizens, making a case for greater separation of “… the oil of politics 
and the water of expertise … at every institutional level” and arguing that this is 
“…essential if the integrity of scientific advice, and the very idea of science, is to survive”. 
Collins also recognises that many choices will ultimately be based on political judgements 
but claims that the proposed separation will clarify the nature of those political choices. 
Pielke (2007) has focused on the roles adopted by scientists in advising policy makers: 
the pure scientist, the science arbiter, the issue advocate, and the honest broker. He 
notes that all four roles are relevant and useful in a democratic process, but he also points 
to the existence of ‘stealth issue-advocacy’, which allows an adviser to claim to be 
“…above the fray, invoking the historical authority of science while working to restrict the 
scope of choice”, a role that has been taken up very effectively by some social scientists 
and has had a strong influence on the governance of GM crops in the EU (Mayer and 
Stirling (2002); Millstone et al. (1999); Von Schomberg (1998); Wickson and Wynne 
(2012)).  
This project will build Pielke’s and Collins’ insights into the Innogen Institute’s research on 
Adaptive Governance of Innovative Technologies (AGIT) and Constructive Stakeholder 
Engagement (CSE), in the context of EU regulatory systems for GM crops and, 
potentially, synthetic biology. 
2. Research Framework for the Project 
The Innogen Institute’s research adopts a triangulation approach (Figure 1) that considers 
how the fate of life science products and processes, in particular their ability to reach 
practical application in a commercial or public sector market, depends on the interactions 
among three constituencies: (i) scientists/innovators; (ii) policy makers and government; 
and (iii) citizens/stakeholder groups. Our research methods consider in detail the 
behaviour and decisions of actors in each of these constituencies, with an internal focus 
on innovation business models and value chains and an external perspective on the 
actions and influences of the other two constituencies. This enables us to locate pressure 
points that could deliver change or realignment in overall system behaviour, for example 
so that innovation could take place more rapidly and more cost-effectively without lowering 
safety standards.  
This project has focused mainly on the interactions within and between policy 
makers/government (based on the Adaptive Governance of Innovative Technologies 
(AGIT) approach (Tait and Chataway, 2007; Tait, 2008, 2009, 2012; Tait and Barker, 
2011)), and public/stakeholder groups (based on the Constructive Stakeholder 
Engagement (CSE) approach (Bruce, 2011; Tait, 2009b)), as they impact on the third set 
of constituencies - scientists/innovators.  
The project incorporated Syngenta’s data, insights and expertise and Innogen’s 
background analysis and research approaches to characterise the problems arising from 
current EU regulation of GM crops and, potentially, future regulatory approaches for new 
research areas such as synthetic biology. We considered how future governance of 
advanced agricultural biotechnologies could be based more effectively on scientific 
evaluation of product risks and benefits and have suggested how firms and policy makers 
could engage on a more balanced basis with civil society stakeholders to enable safe and 
responsible delivery of innovative products. 
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Policy makers and government:
• respond to new products and processes 
from industry
• licence and regulate products and 
processes, set standards and penalties
• respond to public interests and concerns
• balance industry/public interests
Members of the public and stakeholder 
groups:
• exert political influence
• beneficiaries of new products and 
processes
• selective bearers of some risks
• motivations based on a mix of self 
interest, values and ideology
Scientists and Innovators:
• generate new ideas, 
processes and products 
• satisfy customers
• generate profits
• generate risks and costs to 
themselves and others (policy 
and public communities)
Figure 1. Innogen Centre approach to life science innovation analysis
 
3 The European Regulatory System for GM Crops.  
3.1 The current regulatory system 
As described in more detail in Section 2 of the Annex to this paper, the EU regulatory 
system for GM crops has evolved since the 1980s as a precautionary, process-based 
approach, in contrast to that of the USA which has been more strongly evidence- and 
product-based. As Tait and Levidow (1992) demonstrated when the regulatory system 
was being set up, these very different approaches could have had broadly comparable 
impacts on the development of GM crop technology on either side of the Atlantic, 
depending on how they were implemented by regulators. Both could have been equally 
vulnerable to the politicisation that has so far occurred mainly in the EU.  
We focused on the following risk-related requirements placed on applicants wishing to 
introduce a GM crop on the market for cultivation in the EU by Directive 2001/18/EC: an 
environmental risk assessment; post market monitoring plans; provision of information to 
the public; labelling and traceability provisions at all stages of development; information 
on identification and detection of the GMO.  
The European Food Standards Authority (EFSA) is the lead agency in managing the 
application process. For cultivation applications, it allocates the company’s application for 
regulatory approval to one of the European national competent authorities (CAs). At this 
stage, the CAs of other EU member states have the opportunity to ask further questions 
or to ask for clarification of specific points in the dossier. Once the dossier has been given 
a positive assessment by EFSA, the European Commission drafts a decision which is 
presented to the Standing Committee of the Food Chain and Animal Health of Member 
States (Standing Committee) which votes on the decision. Under the old system, in the 
absence of a qualified majority in favour of that decision, the decision would be passed to 
the Council of Ministers and, if there was still no qualified majority in favour, would be 
passed to the European Commission after which the Commission had to act within a 
specified period. Under the current system, in the absence of a qualified majority in favour 
of that decision, the decision would be passed to an Appeals Committee with the power of 
scrutiny. If the Appeals committee rules against the Commission Decision, the 
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Commission must abide by that ruling (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:183:0013:0016:EN:PDF) 
To date the fate of GM crop cultivation applications in the EU has mainly been that, 
following a positive opinion by EFSA, the required qualified majority has not been 
obtained from the Standing Committee, leading to a stalemate as the key actors beyond 
that point in the process are unwilling to take the political responsibility for a decision that 
would follow the European Commission’s recommendations. Recently the agro-
biotechnology company DuPont Pioneer has sued the Commission over delays in 
decisions about cultivation of 1507 maize1. 
The risk assessment requirements of the EU regulatory system are relatively standard 
components of risk- and evidence-based regulatory systems internationally. However, the 
problems for EU governance of GM technologies arise in how the risk related 
requirements are elaborated and the subsequent fate of the EFSA dossier following 
delivery of EFSA’s advice. The expectation in the early 1990s was that, as experience in 
growing GM crops accumulated, the level of precaution applied by the regulatory system 
could gradually be relaxed. However, the reverse has been the case and in the 
intervening period the EU regulatory process has seen a steady increase in the level of 
precaution, with frequent revisions introduced in a capricious fashion in response to 
political pressures from vested interests, mainly environmental advocacy groups and 
political parties.  
3.2 Contributory factors in development of regulatory systems for GM crops. 
Innogen’s research has noted a significant trend in the development of regulatory systems 
for life sciences since the 1980s, when a new policy agenda emerged, supporting a move 
away from the previous government approach based on top-down regulation to a 
governance approach with a much increased role for non-government actors in policy-
making (Lyall and Tait, 2005). We use the term governance here to cover both the 
regulatory system that ensures safety and efficacy of products and processes and the 
political system within which it operates.  
This policy shift in the 1980s enabled the emergence of an advocacy coalition (Sabatier 
and Jenkins Smith, 1993) that campaigned very successfully against GM crops, so that 
the regulatory environment in the EU, and also in United Nations (UN) conventions such 
as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its subsidiary protocols, particularly 
the Cartagena Protocol2, remains extremely restrictive in the context of GM crop 
developments. The EU regulatory system, supported in some contexts by that of the UN, 
is unlikely to be compatible with a profitable European industry sector producing GM 
crops, and development and production of GM crops are now increasingly based outside 
Europe.  
The above policy shift, linked to the coincidental adoption of the precautionary principle, 
undermined the role of scientific evidence in regulatory decision making, replacing it with 
often alarmist conjecture supported by media campaigns. The ideologically motivated 
advocacy groups that dominate the GM crops area are reluctant to change their opinions 
in the face of evidence that challenges their fundamental beliefs (Tait, 2001) and have so 
far been able to maintain political resistance to any attempt to adapt EU GM regulations to 
accommodate the increasing amount of evidence that these products offer alternative or 
significant additional benefits compared to the technologies they would replace. 
                                                
1 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-960_en.htm 
2 The USA is the only major country that is neither a Party nor a Signatory to the CBD; Argentina, Canada, 
Japan and South Africa are Parties but not Signatories to the CP; and Australia and the USA are neither 
Parties nor Signatories to the CP. 
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Thus in the EU, the adoption of a governance approach has led to steady erosion of the 
quality of the evidence base to support regulatory decision making (Tait and Lyall, 2005). 
More generally the systemic interactions among the three constituencies in Figure 1 have 
become increasingly dysfunctional in the context of the development of agricultural 
biotechnology, with no simple or obvious mechanisms for resolution of the impasse.  
4. Experience of two GM Crops (Bt11 maize and GA21 maize (hereafter referred to 
as Bt11 and GA21 respectively)) in the European Regulatory System 
We analysed Syngenta data on two GM products, Bt11 and GA21 maize, in their passage 
through the European regulatory system, in order to generate evidence relevant to its 
current state and to identify how its operation could become more adaptive to evidence of 
its risks and safety. 
The case studies, described in detail in the Annex, explored the nature of the relationship 
between changes in scientific uncertainty and the role of regulatory science in evaluating 
the risks of GMO crop cultivation. We also considered the nature of the precautionary 
political overlay that has essentially stalled the approval of these products. In the case of 
Bt11, for example, the scientific evidence and level of uncertainty about potential 
environmental impacts has changed substantially since the original application for 
cultivation was submitted in the late 1990s. Yet, this has so far proven insufficient to 
achieve a final decision. The Bt11 product is unusual when compared to other GMOs, 
including GA21, in terms of the approval process, since the initial application submission 
predated the existence of EFSA, so the product has been subject to a number of different 
regulatory regimes and has had to adapt to the emergence of new regulatory guidelines 
and protocols.  
The GA21 case study revealed two main challenges facing GMO cultivation in Europe. 
First, the lack of agreed and workable parameters as to what are considered sufficient 
and necessary data to satisfy risk assessors, despite the fact that there are agreed upon 
methodologies and a scientific process. Second, a lack of agreement on what is sufficient 
within studies to demonstrate safety and minimize risk. These challenges were reflected 
in the responses and questions posed by EFSA, as well as the questions and objections 
from member country CAs.  
Both case studies also highlight the long timelines for approval, which have cost 
implications, despite time limits imposed by EFSA. This was evident in the GA21 case 
study, where the ‘clock stops’ when questions are submitted through EFSA by member 
states.  
Our conclusions from the case studies can be summarised as follows: 
1. The political constraints placed on the approval process have so far made it 
impossible for the EFSA positive scientific opinions about GM crop cultivation in 
the EU to be followed through in practice. Where member states raise reference 
questions on points that Syngenta has already answered, EFSA nevertheless 
sometimes requests more information or additional data from the company. Thus, 
the parameters for good and sufficient evidence for risk assessment are not 
always clear and are often shaped by politics. A summary and explanation of 
comments/questions posed by member states for both case studies is presented 
in Table 1 below.  
2. EFSA and many CAs often blur the boundaries between the science of risk-
assessment and scientific research. Thus in both case studies additional data or 
research were regularly requested that were not directly relevant to risk 
assessment. Consequently, there were no clear endpoints to the risk assessment 
process. The initial scientific opinion of EFSA on Bt11 in 2005, for instance, should 
have represented an endpoint in regulatory decision-making, if risk-assessment 
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has been the primary objective. However, since Bt11 has now been in the system 
for 17 years without a final decision, this has clearly moved beyond a risk-
assessment process.  
3. The political process appears to be considerably more restrictive than the 
regulatory process. Regulation can be long and complicated but should, if done 
correctly, produce an outcome. In the cases of Bt11 and GA21, the political 
process remains an indefinite barrier to introduction of these products in the EU.  
4. Finally, given that both case study products have already been cultivated in many 
countries with no reports of adverse effects, this can be seen as indicating an 
absence of harm for both products, once again raising the question of what 
constitutes sufficient evidence of safety for EU regulators. The lack of operational 
definitions of terms such as harm and safety makes it easy to delay EU decision 
making by pointing to lack of evidence without specifying explicitly what evidence 
is being sought or what criteria and standards are required to be met.  
We can conclude from these case studies that GM applications face (i) a set of normative 
positions attempting to block the process of approval, and (ii) a lack of parameters 
specifying what are sufficient data and what issues should be placed on the table, thereby 
potentially extending the regulatory process indefinitely. At present, there is no clear sign 
that definitive decisions are being contemplated for these issues.  
 
Table 1. Total questions/statements from CAs  
Member 
Country 
Total questions/ 
statements (GA21) 
Total questions/ 
statements (Bt11) 
Austria 25 5 
Belgium 4 10 
Denmark  3 
Finland 1 3 
Germany 31 19 
Hungary 2  
Ireland 2 1 
Italy 1 14 
Norway 6  
Spain 2 1 
Sweden 4 10 
Netherlands 2 3 
UK 4 4 
Total 84 73 
 
In the case of Bt11, of the 73 questions/statements submitted by member states, 13 were 
simple reference statements, 2 were explicitly negative statements, 41 requested more 
data or clarification of data and 17 challenged the appropriateness or relevance of the 
scientific studies recommended by EFSA3. Germany and Austria were the two countries 
that submitted the most objections. The principal objections (relating predominantly to the 
environmental risk assessment (ERA) were the potential adverse effects on soil 
                                                
3 These challenges were not considered relevant or sufficient by EFSA 
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organisms and arthropods, and the long-term effects on the environment of the Bt-toxin, 
which is contained in the product. 
For GA21, of the 84 questions/statements submitted by member states, 10 were 
statements referring to other studies or data the member CA thought relevant in its 
analysis or of which it thought Syngenta and/or EFSA should be aware; 5 were negative 
statements disagreeing with some element of Syngenta’s submission; 26 were questions 
or statements requesting more data or clarification, delivered in a neutral tone (i.e. not 
questioning the relevance or appropriateness of Syngenta’s study, but asking for more 
information beyond that submitted); 43 directly questioned the appropriateness or 
relevance of Syngenta’s studies or of its conclusions based on the study descriptions/data 
submitted; again most were not considered relevant by EFSA. As in the case of Bt11, 
Austria and Germany were by far the most critical.   
5. Adaptive Governance of Innovative Biotechnologies 
5.1 The Governance agenda and EU regulations 
The new governance agenda adopted by European politicians in the 1990s has taken a 
highly precautionary approach to dealing with uncertainty, particularly for agricultural 
biotechnologies. This, coupled with upstream public engagement that sought to give more 
power to the voices of ordinary citizens in making decisions on all aspects of innovation 
from funding of the basic science to product approval (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004) has 
contributed to the current stalemate in EU decision making on GM technologies.  
The social science field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) has played an 
important role since the 1990s in channelling public responses to GM and other novel 
biotechnologies into decision making on science funding and product development. 
Academics working in this area have undertaken much of the research on upstream 
engagement and have contributed significantly to the development of government policies 
nationally and internationally (Mayer and Stirling (2002); Millstone et al. (1999); Von 
Schomberg (1998); Wickson and Wynne (2012). 
This approach has been at the expense of a broader societal consensus that could have 
generated agreement on the nature of relevant harms and benefits and then balanced the 
risks and opportunities arising from agricultural biotechnologies. As noted in Section 1.2 
above, this is the kind of process that would be required to address the question of 
closure of ‘the policy gap’. The current situation has thus meant that the regulatory system 
has been unable to adapt to new information about the safety of products, to allow 
European farmers to make choices in the market place about whether to grow GM crops, 
and citizens to choose freely whether to purchase GM food products. 
5.2 The Adaptive Governance of Innovative Technology (AGIT) Approach 
The AGIT approach being developed by the Innogen Institute has been designed to avoid 
this kind of systemic impasse and also, once such an impasse has arisen, to enable a 
more balanced outcome to emerge over time. It is adaptive in the sense of being able to 
respond to new knowledge about the properties of products and the innovation 
ecosystems within which they will be developed and also in understanding how existing 
regulatory systems could be modified to enable more innovation and more radical 
innovation to emerge from current research without jeopardising standards of safety and 
efficacy.  
Section 3.1 distinguished between the precautionary, process-based approach adopted 
for GM innovations in the EU and the product-based approach in operation in the USA. 
However, this product / process distinction now appears somewhat simplistic and out-
dated. The nature of a product and the process by which it is developed will be relevant at 
different stages of the innovation path for different types of innovation and the challenge is 
to select the most appropriate criteria for regulation of each class of innovation as it 
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emerges from basic research and at different points in its development. The AGIT 
approach builds on the body of research on upstream governance of new technologies 
arising from the STS research community and extends it to be more adaptive in the 
context of new knowledge and experience, alongside a more constructive approach to 
stakeholder engagement (Figure 2).  
Innogen’s AGIT approach could be a basis for progressing to more effective risk 
management of agricultural biotechnologies. The core perspective is that of the 
companies and scientists involved in the development of new technologies (Chataway et 
al., 2006), as they are translated from scientific research to real world applications. These 
are the activities conducted by science and innovation communities as they are affected 
by policy makers/regulators and by citizens and other stakeholders, i.e. the other two 
constituencies that form the triangle (Figure 1). The translation process involves two 
overlapping contexts, presenting different policy and engagement challenges and 
requiring different policy and engagement approaches (Figure 2). 
• The upstream area at the top of the diagram covers the early stages of scientific 
research or translation, before it is clear what the exact nature of an innovation will be, 
when it will reach a market place, or what the relevant harms and benefits (or risks 
and opportunities (the latter defined as size of benefit x likelihood of benefit) will be. In 
this context, engagement and governance should focus on the novelty of the research 
processes being developed (GM in the 1980s or synthetic biology today) and any 
hazard that might be demonstrated by the process itself, rather than the still-
unpredictable features of the final applications.  
• In the downstream area, innovations in later stages of development will be relatively 
well characterised, including understanding of their potential benefits and the 
likelihood of any harmful effects (GM crops today), and conventional product 
regulation should be the usual mode of policy action, focusing more on the nature of 
the products themselves and less on the process by which they were developed. 
Different issues arise, and different governance guidelines are appropriate, for these two 
contexts. Also, engagement with members of the public and with other stakeholders 
should take on different characteristics at each stage leading to different forms of 
stakeholder influence on governance processes (see Section 6). Likewise, the nature and 
degree of uncertainty changes as an innovation moves from research to translation to 
application. Upstream the main uncertainty is about whether the science can be made to 
work and what kinds of innovation are likely to emerge. Downstream uncertainty will be 
more resolvable by basic research that characterises the risks and opportunities of the 
various innovations. The governance approach adopted needs to be able to 
accommodate and adapt to such changes, particularly at the junction of the upstream and 
downstream processes in Figure 2. Any regulatory or governance approach put in place 
as part of upstream governance needs to have a specifically designed capacity to be 
adaptive in the face of new information that emerges in the translation process and in 
actual use. 
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Figure 2. Adaptive Governance of Innovative 
Technology (AGIT)
 
5.2.1 Upstream governance 
For governance of research processes themselves and of products in very early stages of 
development concerns often relate to uncertainty about the nature and impacts of future 
products and processes with a stronger focus on ethical questions than for most well 
characterised products. In such cases, policy makers are struggling to keep pace with 
scientific developments and in some cases are attempting to leapfrog ahead of the 
research itself involving both upstream regulation and upstream engagement.  
In implementing upstream governance, it is generally desirable to refrain from imposing 
regulatory constraints on development of new products and processes until there is good 
information on the nature of their benefits and risks, i.e. as far downstream as possible. 
However, pressures for more upstream regulation and governance can arise from 
investors who are reluctant to invest in new technology until they know what will be the 
nature of future regulatory systems. Likewise citizens who, as part of an upstream 
engagement process, are consulted about innovative science and technology in the very 
early stages of development often want to be reassured that it will be developed within a 
strong regulatory framework to ensure safety and/or delivery of public (as opposed to 
commercial) benefits.  
Policy makers should, however, be more aware of the impact of their decisions on 
innovation futures. The nature of a governance approach chosen early in the development 
of new products can profoundly affect the innovation potential of entire industry sectors 
and indeed the capacity of countries and regions to compete in global markets. There is a 
history of decisions taken in early stages of product development, that are then difficult to 
change, and have unforeseen and counter-productive outcomes, particularly where 
regulation has been designed to reassure public opinion or to forestall perceived ethical 
concerns based on extreme interpretations of the precautionary principle (Tait, 2008). For 
example, if GM crops had been regulated from the earliest stage of development as if 
they were new crop varieties rather than as if they were more akin to pesticides, some 
would have been developed initially by seed companies rather than agrochemical 
companies, with a range of different first generation products and possibly with very 
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different European public attitudes to the technology. GM crops were a disruptive, path-
breaking technology4 for the agrochemical industry sector but would have been easier to 
take to market, and with a different set of first generation technologies, where they had 
been developed by seed companies (Tait, 2007).  
The following upstream guidelines are suggested for Adaptive Governance of Innovative 
Technology:  
1. When considering which regulatory precedent is most appropriate for a newly 
emerging technology, a useful ground rule would be to choose the regulatory 
system in operation for the industry sector for which the innovation is path-
dependent rather than one for which it is path-breaking (Tait, 2007). 
2. Ensure that governance or regulatory decisions that are made very early in the 
development of innovative technologies have the capacity to be adaptive, i.e. 
retain scope for future modification of policies and regulations as more is learned 
about the opportunities and risks of a technology (Tait, 2009). 
5.2.2 Downstream regulation 
For products whose properties are well characterised, for example the GM crops available 
for use in non-EU countries, the EU governance deficits noted in this project have led to 
increases in the cost and time to obtain regulatory approval and political constraints have 
ensured that even products given a positive scientific opinion by the EFSA are not able to 
be introduced into European cropping systems. Instead of being adaptive, the regulatory 
system has become increasingly inflexible and difficult to modify in ways that are 
appropriate, given the current state of knowledge about the risks and benefits of GM 
crops.  
Innogen has carried out a comparative analysis of industry R&D decision making in the 
context of pesticide regulatory systems (Chataway et al., 2006).  
• We demonstrated that the US Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), 1996, was 
enabling of innovation by offering incentives for development of products with 
desirable properties (access to a regulatory fast track) and by discriminating 
among products on an appropriate basis (toxicity to people and the environment).  
• The EU Drinking Water Directive (DWD) (80/778/EEC) on the other hand 
constrained innovation by creating disincentives for undesirable behaviour 
(banning any pesticide that was found to be present in drinking water at a level 
greater than 0.1ppm) and thereby discriminating among products on an 
inappropriate basis (mobility in soils).  
In this earlier research project, the key example demonstrating this difference was the 
strobilurin fungicides developed by Zeneca Plant Sciences (one of Syngenta’s 
predecessors, along with Novartis). These fungicides are extremely safe to people and 
the environment and were the first product to be fast-tracked under the FQPA, but were 
considered by the company to be potentially vulnerable under the DWD. GM crops in the 
EU today can be regarded as subject to constraining and indiscriminate regulation (see 
Table 1). 
                                                
4 Innovations are categorised, on the one hand as incremental or path dependent; on the other hand as 
disruptive or path breaking. The terms ‘path-dependent’ and ‘incremental’ are used here to describe 
innovations that present few developmental challenges to the prevailing system of innovation and are easily 
accommodated within it. Disruptive innovation steps outside existing paradigms leading to discontinuities in 
innovation pathways, to major shifts in product types and their place in the market, and potentially to the 
creation of new industry sectors or radical re-structuring of existing sectors. 
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Innogen research has identified a set of guidelines for downstream regulation of 
innovative technologies based on a comparative analysis of industry R&D decision 
making in the context of pesticide regulatory systems (Chataway et al., 2006): 
1. Policy makers should recognise their role in enabling or constraining innovation 
and take this into account in their decisions - enabling, discriminating regulation 
works better and faster than regulation that is constraining and indiscriminate in 
its focus. 
2. Where a product has strong potential societal benefits, regulators could consider 
using policy incentives, such as market mechanisms, infrastructure investment 
or regulatory fast tracks, to speed up the regulatory process and create a 
selective advantage relative to other products. 
3. Regulatory decisions should balance both risks and opportunities to people and 
the environment, rather than focusing exclusively on risks. 
4. Policy makers should be explicit about political influences on their decisions. 
5. Regulatory science should be an important component of the process of 
adaptation, considering technical solutions as alternatives or complements to 
conventional regulation.  
 
Table 1. What works in regulatory policy 
Enabling 
regulation 
Provides encouragement or inducements to undertake a desired 
course of action 
(carrots rather 
than sticks) 
Affects the speed with which a particular regulatory policy is able to 
exert its influence 
Discriminating 
regulation 
Discriminates among products on an appropriate basis to favour 
those that deliver the desired policy aim 
(akin to Nudge 
Theory) 
The extent and appropriateness of its discrimination among 
products or processes will determine a policy’s effectiveness in 
guiding product development in particular directions 
Constraining 
regulation 
Creates disincentives to undertaking undesirable actions 
Indiscriminate 
regulation 
Regulates all products in a class similarly and on an inappropriate 
basis, regardless of their properties 
 
6. A More Balanced and Constructive Approach to Stakeholder Engagement (CSE)  
Life science innovation has been at the forefront in the development of public and 
stakeholder engagement as part of the new governance agenda for science and 
technology. As one response to the governance deficit in the development of GM crops in 
Europe, the opportunities for members of the public and pressure groups representing 
them to engage in dialogue about the development of new technologies, and through this 
to influence policy, has increased dramatically, and formal public dialogue has been 
undertaken much further upstream in the innovation process. While the aims of the 
engagement agenda on GM crops are laudable, the process itself has not been without 
problems, including undue optimism about our capacity to foresight technology 
developments and societal needs on a timescale of more than five years, the malleability 
of public opinion, and the vulnerability of stakeholder engagement initiatives to 
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manipulation by vested interests (Tait, 2009a). Innogen’s guidelines for constructive 
stakeholder engagement have been developed in order to address some of these issues.  
We make a distinction between ‘engagement’ and ‘dialogue’, the former implying an 
intention to take action based on preferences expressed in the discussion, and the latter 
implying a process of mutual information and exchange of ideas and perspectives with no 
expectation that specific actions will arise from the discussions.  
6.1 Upstream engagement/dialogue 
Dialogue at the upstream stage should involve a wide spectrum of societal interests and 
values, and consider the nature of the research processes involved and the expected 
outcomes of this process, in terms of product types and their expected risks and 
opportunities. Ideally, it should be a process of dialogue and explanation where those with 
different areas of expertise and different interests and values explain their perspectives in 
an open ended manner. However, to date, most upstream engagement initiatives have 
involved a relatively narrow spectrum of interests, values and expertise with a strong 
emphasis on members of the general public and NGOs as their representatives, often 
accompanied by the presumption that some action will ensue, building on the outcome of 
an engagement initiative (Stilgoe and Wilsdon, 2009).  
Our view is that the focus for discussion at this stage should be mainly on the research 
process itself. Where this may present specific hazards, it is valid to take account of public 
concerns and values in deciding whether certain aspects of research should or should not 
be undertaken and what precautions are needed, e.g. in terms of containment for 
research on new biotechnologies. There should also be dialogue about the nature of 
future products arising from the scientific research. However, given the nature of 
innovation processes and limited human foresighting capacities, it is not appropriate to 
make decisions at this stage on which types of product should be developed or on how 
they should be developed. It is certainly unwise to make decisions on funding of basic 
science based on such engagement activities. 
We propose the following guidelines for managing dialogue and engagement in an 
upstream context with a view to avoiding domination of the engagement process by 
participants with value-based or ideological commitments: 
• Focus on the process of dialogue rather than promising to take action 
based on the outcomes of engagement.  
• Include a balanced range of stakeholders - scientists, company 
managers, interest groups (e.g. farmers), NGOs and citizens.  
• Support individual choice where possible and consider carefully the 
ethical circumstances where it would be valid to allow the values and 
interests of one group to restrict the freedom of choice of others. 
• In addition to the science and risks of potential new developments, 
include in the dialogue discussion about innovation and regulatory 
processes and how these can be used to safeguard against future 
risks. 
• Set standards for the quality and breadth of evidence brought to the 
discussions and encourage willingness to listen to, and to 
accommodate, the views of others.  
• Encourage a better understanding of science so that people are able 
to judge for themselves the quality of the evidence presented.  
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6.2 Downstream engagement/dialogue 
Engagement or dialogue in the downstream area should focus more on the technology 
and innovations in development, rather than the research process that led to them, While 
the views of the general public are relevant here and should be included, there should be 
an equally strong focus on those directly affected by, or interested in, the innovative 
technology being developed, e.g. with farmers, supermarkets and consumer organisations 
in the case of GM crops.  
Engagement in contentious areas like GM crops can increase levels of conflict rather than 
leading to mutual accommodation (Tait, 2009a; Sunstein, 2009) and this can lead to 
increased public pressure on policy makers and developers of the technology throughout 
downstream development of products, making it more difficult to deal with deficits in risk 
governance. Thus, although the above guidelines for upstream engagement are also 
broadly relevant at downstream stages of technology development, the focus should be 
on more concrete applications of the technology, how they are likely to be developed as 
innovative products, how their risks will be regulated by pre-existing or new regulatory 
systems, and the societal and economic benefits they may deliver. 
7. Conclusions and Discussion 
7.1 European Governance of GM crops  
The European regulatory system for GM crops is widely regarded as a failure of evidence-
based risk governance - it is one of the most onerous regulatory systems in existence for 
commercially traded products, despite a lack of evidence of health or environment-related 
risks (The Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM), 2006; Nature 
(Anon), 2007; Morris and Spillane, 2008; Tait, 2008; Masip et al., 2013). Research 
undertaken for this project has reinforced, and provided additional evidence for, the 
conclusion that the EU governance system for GM crops is overly dominated by political 
considerations, despite the claims of EFSA to avoid undermining the scientific evidence 
base (Devos et al., 2013a).  
The identification of a ‘policy gap’, as outlined in Section 1 above, could lead to the 
conclusion that the failure of the EU system lies in its pretence that regulation can be 
based solely on scientific evidence and that, rather than making its political objectives 
clear, this political influence leads the Commission to obfuscate by requiring more 
evidence on the basis that reducing scientific uncertainty will lead to better decisions. 
Collins et al. (2010) acknowledge the importance of values and political motivations in 
influencing regulatory decisions but they also make the case for a clearer separation of 
scientific evidence and political influences. The theoretical structure of the EU regulatory 
system whereby EFSA deals with the scientific aspects of product approval and the 
dossier is then passed to the European Commission for the final decision with an 
acknowledged political overlay (Section 3) could be seen as an attempt to make this 
separation, but the two case studies discussed in Section 4 demonstrate the extent to 
which political influences have also become an integral part of the EFSA role. 
Disputes based on normative values will not be resolvable by provision of information 
based on scientific evidence (Tait, 2001; Devos et al., 2013b) and the role of the social 
sciences to date in decision making on GM crop development illustrates this point. The 
focus has been on stakeholder (mainly citizen) engagement as a means of achieving 
consensus around the development of GM crops. The focus of this academic agenda was 
very explicitly not to persuade citizens to accept specific innovations, but to guide 
governments to focus their research and innovative support activities towards areas that 
European citizens currently favour (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004). This is typical of the kind of 
research agenda that arises from a narrow focus that is confined within the methods and 
concerns of a single academic discipline, in this case mainly sociology.  
 15 
One of the conclusions of this project is that the answer to politicisation of the EU 
regulatory system cannot lie in clearer definitions of safety and harm. Rather than lack of 
clearer definitions making it easier to delay decisions, the political desire on the part of 
some countries to delay decisions will preclude giving clearer operational definitions. 
Thus, while a focus on the policy gap helps us to understand the problem, that 
understanding does not give us any leverage to resolve it. This project has broadened the 
social science perspective to include our understanding of innovation and governance 
processes (Figure 1) and has demonstrated how the focus on engagement alone is an 
inadequate basis for decision making on which research to fund and how to promote 
specific types of innovation arising from that research.  
The complexity and intractability of the EU risk governance problem requires a broader, 
more systemic approach to its resolution and our proposals for a more adaptive approach 
to the governance of GM technologies in Europe, along with a more constructive 
approach to stakeholder engagement, could go some way to meeting this challenge. This 
report makes the case that the currently restricted array of social science inputs to 
decision making on life science innovation, while it may lead to interesting academic 
research, is an inadequate basis for decision making about which basic science to fund, 
which innovations to support, how best to provide that support, and how to govern 
emerging biotechnologies. As outlined in Sections 5 and 6 above, we need a more 
adaptive and balanced approach to the governance of new biotechnologies, along with a 
more constructive approach to stakeholder engagement.  
The role of the impartial academic here, as honest broker (Pielke, 2007), is to clarify 
possible outcomes and seek to expand the choices available to decision makers, but to 
refrain from advocating any particular course of action. Likewise, the work of Collins 
(2008) in support of the role of scientifically informed experts in science policy decision 
making would restrict the role of citizens to political processes where a democratically 
determined balance of perspectives should be considered. In this spirit, our view is that 
the recommendations in Sections 5 and 6, mainly actions for government and policy 
makers, could have a role in tailoring the innovation ecosystem (or external operating 
environment) to enable scientists and companies to develop GM and related technologies 
that will meet societal needs in a safe, affordable and indeed profitable manner.  
7.2 The Future Governance of New Technologies for Agriculture 
New technologies have the potential to lead to agricultural innovations that are path 
breaking or radical, and others that are path-dependent or incremental (Tait, 2007). 
Radical, path breaking technologies are more likely to open up major new industry sectors 
that have the capacity to provide answers for intractable societal problems or to satisfy 
needs of which we may currently be unaware. Incremental, path-dependent innovations 
on the other hand will enable important step changes in the efficiency and effectiveness of 
current innovation value chains, improving the competitiveness of current industry sectors.  
For path-dependent technologies there is usually a well defined regulatory precedent that 
can be adapted to the issues likely to be raised by the new technology. Path-breaking 
technologies on the other hand present particular challenges for policy makers and risk 
regulators in that there may be no obvious match between the expected properties of the 
new technology and an existing regulatory system.  
Often a technology can be path-breaking for one industry sector and path dependent for 
another, and the choice of an inappropriate regulatory precedent can have damaging 
impacts on the range of innovation opportunities that can be pursued by an industry 
sector. The agrochemical companies of the 1980s have become the agro-biotechnology 
companies of today, and looking forward from this point, novel approaches to GM crop 
development and many aspects of new biotechnologies would now be path-dependent 
innovations for these companies, given their evolutionary trajectory over the past twenty 
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five years. For example, Syngenta’s Good Growth strategy aims to raise the productivity 
of major crops without using more land, water and inputs (Terazono, 2013). This 
approach will enable the company to innovate more effectively and more rapidly using 
novel biotechnologies than agro-biotechnology companies that retain more traditional 
product development strategies.  
In the context of synthetic biology and other novel technologies, policy makers see the 
extended programme of upstream engagement that has been undertaken in the UK 
(Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng), 2009; BBSRC/EPSRC, 2010) as contributing to 
avoiding the emergence of entrenched ideological opposition to these technologies. 
However, it is too early to make this judgement, and there is now a concerted effort by an 
influential group of NGOs to develop a new wave of proselytising around synthetic biology 
developments. As was the case with GM crops, the area of maximum policy turbulence, 
and hence opportunity to influence public opinion and recruit new members to an NGO, is 
likely to emerge at the transition between upstream and downstream governance in the 
translation of innovative technology (Figure 2). Many of the new technologies, beyond 
incremental improvements on first generation GM technology, are not yet close to having 
a significant market presence, but some developments involving modified micro-
organisms are sitting on this threshold, e.g. areas of industrial biotechnology that will 
enable the bio-manufacture of high value chemicals.   
The expected choice in the EU to use GM regulatory systems as the precedent for 
synthetic biology developments, makes sense in the context of the envisaged areas of 
application and the expected properties of innovative products and processes. However, 
in the context of the current nature of the EU regulatory system for GM products, this 
choice has the potential to create major barriers to future innovations based on synthetic 
biology and a range of other new biotechnology developments. 
The importance of adopting the GM precedent for the governance of synthetic biology in 
Europe cannot be exaggerated. The existing costs to the EU of the current regulatory 
system for GM crops, food and feed, in terms of opportunities and jobs lost, companies, 
industries and countries disadvantaged, and regulatory time and resources wasted, is 
likely to be multiplied many-fold if this regulatory approach is extended to synthetic biology 
in its current form. 
Achieving an approach that is open, adaptive and supportive of innovation will be needed 
to deliver the expected public benefits in medicines and healthcare, fine and specialty 
chemicals, energy, environment, sensors, agriculture and food (UK Synthetic Biology 
Roadmap Coordination Group, 2012). This will involve understanding, and balancing the 
interactions among: scientists and innovators; policy makers and regulators; and citizens 
and stakeholders (Figure 1). Governance decisions will need to be based on a better 
understanding of how social and technological systems interact and of how regulatory 
systems can be designed both to maintain safety and efficacy and to guide and support 
innovation, backed up by better foresighting of societal needs and engagement processes 
that recognise a broader range of stakeholder perspectives than has been the case to 
date. 
Taking account of these interactions, the development of novel biotechnologies and the 
delivery of public benefits from the UK investment in basic science will be best served by 
a governance approach that is adaptive and constructively consultative, as outlined above 
in Sections 5 and 6. Governance processes will need to be adaptive to different stages in 
the emergence of novel biotechnologies: in upstream stages of development (Figure 2) 
the main focus of governance activities will be on the scientific research itself and how it 
can be managed in the best interests of citizens, companies, the UK environment and the 
national economy. Any tentative conclusions or decisions about governance of future 
innovations at this stage should be designed to be adaptive in the face of new and 
unpredicted innovative outcomes.  
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Where innovations are moving downstream, governance questions should focus on the 
nature of the proposed products rather than the processes that contribute to their 
development, including ensuring adaptive approaches to regulation and constructive 
citizen engagement. Likewise, at this stage, stakeholder dialogue should focus mainly, but 
not exclusively, on the innovations themselves and their relative risks and opportunities.  
Policy processes should build on the expertise of a broad range of academic disciplines 
and stakeholders to address practical questions about innovation in new biotechnologies 
and its governance. In the natural sciences, there is a need to give balanced 
consideration to the skills and understanding of engineers, biologists and mathematical 
modellers. This scientific understanding should form the bedrock for an interdisciplinary 
social science perspective that includes group psychology, risk analysis, politics and 
policy analysis, management science and innovation analysis, in addition to the sociology 
and bioethics approaches that have so far dominated social science contributions to 
policy decision making.  
This will enable a more effective approach to guiding the development of these complex 
new areas of science and innovation, focusing on interactions that can have a key impact 
on shaping the future industry sectors involved and the range of innovations that arise 
from new scientific knowledge, including benefits to agriculture, human health, the 
environment and the economy.  
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1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
The project Engaging with Uncertainty and Risk focused on assessment of the 
environmental risks associated with the introduction of GM crops in the European Union. 
It addressed the following questions, as proposed by Syngenta: 
1. What is the origin of the “risk assessment – policy gap” in the regulation of 
agricultural biotechnology in Europe? 
2. What can we learn from analysis of the risk assessment – policy gap to avoid 
the imposition of disproportionate regulation of products derived from 
applications of synthetic biology? 
3. How may social sciences help Syngenta to innovate and bring new products to 
market? 
4. What collaborative research projects in the social sciences should Syngenta 
make priorities? 
These questions were complemented by the following objectives from Innogen’s proposal 
to ESRC: 
1. To develop a joint analysis with Syngenta of the nature and origins of the risk 
assessment-policy gap in current policies and regulations relevant to the approval 
of the products of agricultural biotechnology in Europe; 
2. To conduct two policy analysis case studies of GM crop regulation in the EU, 
herbicide tolerant maize (GA21) and Bt maize (Bt11), to determine whether and 
how Innogen’s AGIT and CSE approaches can contribute constructively to 
improving the analysis of, and decision making on, risk regulation for product 
approval (incorporating Syngenta research question 2); 
3. Through this experience, to develop these Innogen approaches as more widely 
applicable policy analysis methodologies for a range of governance issues in 
agriculture-related life sciences; 
4. Based on the two case study policy analyses to demonstrate how the ‘risk 
assessment policy gap’ could be avoided or minimised in the regulation of future 
agricultural biotechnologies such as synthetic biology, and to make 
recommendations on how firms operating in this area can engage with 
policymakers and civic stakeholders to deliver innovative products safely and 
ethically (incorporating Syngenta research questions 3 and 4);  
5. To organise working group meetings to engage with industry, policy makers and 
stakeholder groups to discuss our findings and methodology and the implications 
of our results; and to publish Innogen policy briefs and one or more peer-reviewed 
journal articles, along with working papers and conference papers 
The research was conducted in three phases: 
Phase 1 
To deliver on Syngenta Research Question 1 and Innogen Objective 1, in Phase 1 we 
explored the origins and impact of the risk assessment-policy gap as perceived by 
Syngenta and, building on this, developed the Phase 2 research approach. This 
background scoping phase also included an analysis of the current regulatory approaches 
for GM crops in operation in the EU, Canada and USA (Section 2 of this Annex). 
Phase 2 
To cover Syngenta Research Question 2 and Innogen Objectives 2 and 3, Phase 2 
analysed the two case studies (GA21 and Bt11) and produced two case study reports 
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(Section 3 of this Annex). The case studies were based on documentary analysis of 
Syngenta files related to EU regulatory review of these two products, supplemented by 
interviews with Syngenta staff in the UK and Brussels.  
Phase 3 
To cover Syngenta Research Questions 3 and 4, and Innogen Objectives 4 and 5, the 
outcomes of Phases 1 and 2 research contributed to further discussions with Syngenta 
staff, and industry, policy and NGO stakeholders. We were unable to organise the 
proposed workshops in the available timescale but instead conducted telephone 
interviews with key payers in these constituencies, with a view to informing the 
organisation of workshops in late 2013/early 2014, funded by the University of Edinburgh.  
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2. GM CROP REGULATORY APPROACHES IN THE EU, CANADA AND USA 
 
2.1 Regulatory Framework for GMOs in Europe 
2.1.1 Summary of Regulations 
The main legislative instruments are (Kuiper and Davies, 2010): 
1. Directive 90/219/EEC on the contained use of genetically modified micro-
organisms (GMMs) dealing with both research, and industrial development. 
2. Directive 90/220/EEC was responsible for regulating the environmental release of 
GMOs until 2001 when it was replaced by the more precautionary Directive 
2001/18/EC. This directive regulates the release of GMOs into the environment for 
experimental purposes and the placing on the market of GMOs (for the purposes of 
cultivation, import or transformation of GMOs into industrial products). This second 
directive contained a number of important new elements:  
• Defined principles for environmental risk assessment;  
• Mandatory post-marketing monitoring requirements;  
• Mandatory information to the public;  
• Requirement for member states to ensure labelling and traceability at all stages 
whether or not the final product contains modified DNA or proteins (a process-
based approach);  
• Provision of information for identification and detection of GMOs; 
• Approvals for release of GMOs to be limited to 10 years;  
• Obligatory consultation with the Scientific Committee of EFSA; 
• Consultation with the European Parliament on decisions to authorise GMOs; 
• Possibility for Council of Ministers to adopt or reject a commission proposal for 
authorisation of a GMO by qualified majority. 
Gomez-Galera et al (2012) have criticised some of these requirements on the 
grounds that they significantly extend the precautionary approach and make it 
increasingly difficult to commercialise GM products.  
3. Regulation EC 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed, which regulates 
the placing on the market of any GM food or feed, or food containing GMOs.  
4. There are two regulatory routes for applicants to submit an application for a GMO: 
(i) under Regulation EC 1829/2003 through the “one door one key” principle to 
obtain authorisation for deliberate release of a GMO into the environment, in 
accordance with Directive 2001/18/EC, and to use this in GM food or feed, in 
compliance with Regulation EC 1829/2003; or (ii) the application, or part of it, may 
be submitted separately under Regulation EC 1829/2003 and Directive 2001/18/EC. 
The former provides a more centralised and supposedly transparent procedure 
(Figure 1). 
5. Regulation EC 1830/2003 together with Regulation EC 1829/2003 prescribes 
specific labelling and traceability conditions.  
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Figure 1 Centralised approval system in the EU for GM food and feed (may include 
cultivation) according to EC Regulation 1829/2003 
 
 
Source: cited in Costa & Novilla (2012) 
 
2.1.2 Guidance on environmental risk assessment (ERA) of GM Plants 
In 2010, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) published its scientific opinion and 
guidance on risk assessment processes for GMOs, in line with the framework of 
Regulation EC 1829/2003 and Directive 2001/18/EC (EFSA, 2010). This outlined 
requirements for assessing the potential effects of GM plants on the environment and 
attempted to provide a rationale for specific data requirements. It stated that the ERA 
should be ‘carried out on a case-by-case basis, following a step-by-step assessment 
approach.’ The document does not address traceability, labelling or co-existence issues 
socio-economic and ethical issues, being focused on the science and evidence base. It 
also does not consider the overall risk/benefit or deliberate release of GMOs into the 
environment for experimental purposes.  
The report outlines six steps for the ERA, as indicated in Directive 2001/18/EC. 
• Problem formulation, which includes hazard identification 
• Hazard characterisation 
• Exposure characterization 
• Risk characterisation 
• Risk management strategies 
• Overall risk evaluation 
The EFSA Scientific Panel on GMOs has seven areas of concern that must be addressed 
by both applicants and risk assessors: 
• Persistence and invasiveness of the GM plant, including plant-to-plant gene 
transfer 
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• Plant-to-micro-organism gene transfer 
• Interaction of GM plant with target organisms 
• Interaction of GM plant with non-target organisms, including criteria for selection of 
appropriate species.  
• Impact of cultivation, management and harvesting techniques 
• Effect on biogeochemical processes 
• Effects on human and animal health 
The starting point for the process is ‘comparative safety assessment’, the ERA baseline 
being a conventional non-GM crop (Garcia-Alonso, 2011; Schauzu, 2012 ). The 
implication here is that the conventionally grown crop is safe, hence its use as the 
baseline, and the GM crop must be assessed against this. The comparative assessment 
is expected to identify differences between the GM and non-GM crop that could potentially 
lead to adverse environmental effects. Of course, differences will always depend on the 
nature of the trait. The ERA must be carried out in a ‘scientifically sound manner based on 
available scientific and technical data and on a common methodology for the 
identification, gathering and interpretation of the relevant data’ (EFSA, 2010: p 3).  
The outcome of the risk evaluation process should be qualitative and, if possible, 
quantitative advice to risk managers, ‘outlining the nature and magnitude of uncertainties 
associated with the identified risks’ (EFSA, p 3). ERA should follow a ‘weight of evidence 
approach’ and consider both intended and unintended effects. The case-by-case 
approach will mean that the required information may vary depending on the type of GM 
plant, its traits and the intended use and potential receiving environment.  
Data and information may be derived from field trial data, molecular characterisation data, 
compositional data, ecotoxicological testing, modelling and/or desk and literature studies. 
Interpretation of this data must always be considered in a broader environmental context 
according to the EFSA.  
2.1.3 Post-Market Environmental Monitoring (PMEM) 
Regulation EC 1829/2003 requires applicants to implement, if appropriate, a GMO 
monitoring plan for environmental monitoring in order to place on the market a GMO or 
food/feed containing or consisting of GMOs. The extent of the market release is relevant, 
so the plan is targeted rather than considering every possible environmental impact. 
A distinction is made between Case Specific Monitoring (CSM) (to monitor potential 
adverse effects of the GMO or its use that have been explicitly identified in the ERA) and 
General Surveillance (GS) (to anticipate unintended adverse events of the GMO or its 
use on human and animal health or the environment) (Figure 2). GS is implemented if no 
risk has been identified in the ERA. ‘The EFSA GMO Panel is of the opinion that general 
surveillance is a general overseeing of the geographical regions where GM plants are 
grown without having any specific hypothesis on adverse effects on human health or the 
environment. As general surveillance is not hypothesis-driven, it is not conducted using 
directed experimental approaches.’ (EFSA, 87). The EFSA states that existing 
surveillance systems should be used, if appropriate.  
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Figure 2: Representation of Steps 4-6 of ERA  
 
Source, Slides from EC Hearing on PMEM of GM Crops, Brussels, 29 March 2012 
 
2.1.4 Concerns Related to EFSA’s Guidance Document 
The European Commission intends to include EFSA’s guidance document in its 
forthcoming legislation. Garcia-Alonso (Estel Consult Ltd) (2011) has identified a number 
of key issues with this document: (i) it is too open to interpretation and difficult to establish 
the precise data requirements to complete the assessment; (ii) not all of the requirements 
have a clear scientific justification; (iii) some requirements are difficult or impossible to 
fulfil given the current status of knowledge (e.g. the long-term environmental effects); and 
(iv) ‘environmental harm’ is not clearly defined, so applicants must determine what 
differences between the GM and non-GM plant might lead to harm, with no guarantee that 
EFSA will agree with them.  
Garcia-Alonso also claims that the document has been opposed by some Member States, 
due to confusion about what assessment they will need to perform. Applicants have also 
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opposed it because of confusion over the key data requirements to ensure a complete 
dossier. On the other hand, NGOs have criticised the document because they do not 
believe it is sufficiently conservative and precautionary. Thus, a document that was 
intended to provide a clear scientific and evidence-based template for regulatory 
assessment has appeared to provide a relatively vague and ambiguous set of protocols 
that is open to varying interpretations.  
2.1.5 Industry Perspectives on the Regulatory Framework and the Market 
Since the development of the first GM crop in 1984 the number of new crop varieties 
containing biotechnology-derived traits has increased significantly. The majority of 
commercial releases have been field crops such as canola, soybean, maize and cotton, 
modified to exhibit herbicide tolerance and/or insect resistance (Seed Insight, 2011).   
A study by Phillips McDougall (Phillips McDougall, 2011) on behalf of Crop Life 
International estimated that regulatory science related to development of a new GM 
variety was $17.9m (13.1% of total R&D), and registration and regulatory affairs $17.2m 
(12.6% of total R&D). The study also found that regulatory science, registration and 
regulatory affairs accounted for 36.7% of cumulative time involved in development.  
EuropaBio (2012) published a table showing timelines for registration of GM products with 
a positive EFSA safety opinion awaiting Commission action in February 2012, which 
further highlights the very long delays being experienced by developers of the technology. 
Some of these delays and product decisions, according to EuropaBio, are not compliant 
with EU law.  
Costa & Novillo (2012), who work for Monsanto in Spain, have argued that the regulatory 
complexity in Europe, and continued uncertainty, threaten to overwhelm any benefits of 
the technology, in particular the additional requirements of traceability, labelling, 
coexistence, socio-economic issues and liability. They state that so far there have been 
only 6 commercial cultivation approvals for biotechnology crops with in the EU, including 
two Romanian approvals for Roundup Ready soybeans that were discontinued when 
Romania entered the EU, as opposed to 113 in North America. For GM plants resistant to 
insects the authors point out that there have been 15 years of widespread cultivation 
around the world and the number of GM approvals worldwide in 2008 had reached 21 for 
insect resistance and 5 for virus resistance. It is surprising, according to the authors, that 
only one product (MON 810) was approved for EU cultivation at that time , although it was 
later banned in Germany, as discussed below. Two similar insect resistant maize crops 
have been given positive opinions by EFSA but are not currently being cultivated. Thus, 
factors other than safety seem to be bearing on the approval process; one being the 
precautionary principle. The complexity of ERA, local bans and cumbersome coexistence 
rules mean that European farmers continue to have limited access to GM crops.   
Costa and Novillo also argue that changes in genotype may not be larger in a GM crop 
than in one bred by conventional means, and they question some of the basic 
assumptions by regulatory bodies about changes within agro-ecosystems On the broader 
impacts of labelling, traceability and segregation requirements, they argue that this merely 
serves to increase the cost of foods and, along with coexistence requirements, is not 
related to safety.  
Industry is therefore concerned that non-scientific and non-risk based issues are driving 
decision-making about product approvals for GM crops.  
2.1.6 Other Issues/Concerns Relevant to Science and Policy 
Gomez-Galera et al (2012) also raise concerns about the recent changes in the regulatory 
framework for GMOs:  
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• Authorisation for field cultivation of a transgenic crop for research purposes 
(defined as ‘deliberate release’ of a GMO by the EU) begins when the applicant 
submits part B of Directive 2001/18/EC, including an ERA. Although the regulation 
covers the EU as a whole, the notification must be submitted to one competent 
national authority (CA) and the power to approve or reject rests with this authority 
alone. Thus the authorisation of experimental release differs from commercial 
release under Directive 2001/18/EC Part C, which is determined at the European 
Community level. The latter involves an EFSA initial evaluation followed by 
consideration by the EU Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal 
Health. If there is no qualifying majority, a further vote must be taken by the 
Council of Ministers. The authors state: ‘Directive 2001/18/EC requires an initial 
risk evaluation by the member state where the submission was originally placed 
but, because objections from other member states are almost guaranteed, EFSA 
often carries out the evaluation again. Therefore, most applicants now use 
Regulation 1829/2003/EC (GM food and feed)’ (Gomez-Galera et al, 2012: 512). 
• A decision taken at the Community level by the Standing Committee and the 
Council of Ministers is considered final, but they have only reached a qualified 
majority in one case, leaving the Commission to make the final decision in all other 
cases. The authors state: ‘Even so, individual member states often flout this 
procedure and illegally ban the deployment of approved transgenic crops by 
misapplying the ‘safeguard clause’ that allows member states to opt out if they 
provide compelling new scientific information that offers evidence of risk to health 
or the environment’ (Ibid. p 512). This, the authors argue, can lead to arbitrary and 
scientifically unjustified co-existence legislation that has a negative affect on GM 
agriculture. On July 5 2011, the European Parliament approved a proposal to allow 
member states to impede, restrict or ban transgenic crops legally within their 
borders. The intention was to stop tactical voting designed to achieve EU wide 
bans, but the authors believe this will have the opposite effect and lead to arbitrary 
bans that effectively prevent such crops being growing over large areas of the EU.  
Gomez-Galera et al. have concluded, based on case studies in a number European 
countries, that ‘The present system for GM field trial notifications in the EU is haphazard, 
unbalanced and overly complex, strongly discouraging investment in the EU’s much-
touted bioeconomy. Furthermore, the constant challenges to and a modification of the 
regulatory system … do nothing to improve consumer confidence’ (Ibid, p 521). Likewise, 
Fagerstrom et al (2012) argue that ‘the regulatory policies within the EU are still rigid 
enough to prevent most GM crops from leaving the confined laboratory setting; should 
some candidate occasionally overcome the hurdles posed by these policies, the 
precautionary principle is invoked in order to ensure further delaying in its use in the field.’ 
Interest groups are largely blamed for these problems but the risks, costs and 
disadvantages of not growing GM crops receive little attention. Park et al (2011) have 
estimated that EU regulatory constraint on farm income to be between €443 and €929 
million/year. Fagerstrom et al also argue that the approval decision in practice is not 
scientific as member states often ignore the scientific evidence and impose their own 
bans, e.g. the insect resistant GM Maize. MON810 was approved for cultivation in 2005 
but suspended by the German Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety in 
2009 on the grounds that it was a potential hazard to non-target arthropods. Some have 
questioned the scientific justification given by Bohn et al (2012) and Gomez-Galera et al 
(2012) and Fagerstrom et al (2012) believe that the EU’s suggestion to allow countries to 
reject GM crops on socio-economic or ethical grounds, rather than only on the grounds of 
scientific risk assessment, will in the end be counterproductive.  
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 2.2 Regulation of GM Crops in the USA and Canada 
The GM crop regulatory systems in Canada and the United States are both nominally 
product-based, although the Canadian system seems to be more purely product based in 
practice than the US system and also more formal. However, both systems are being 
criticised on the basis of conflicts of interest and vague definitions and rules. 
2.2.1 Canadian system 
The Canadian governance system is supposed to be based on science alone, with the 
formal regulatory process being put into place once a cultivar is obtained (before that, it is 
the breeders responsibility to manage risk). Three main acts govern the regulation of new 
crops:  
1. The Seed Act covering uniformity, stability and uniqueness of the cultivar, as well 
as environmental safety (gene flow, invasiveness and weediness);  
2. Feeds Act and Health of Animals Act which define the safety threshold for animal 
feed, fertilizers, livestock feeds, and veterinary biologics, including those derived 
from biotechnology;  
3. Food and Drugs Act which defines the safety threshold for human food.  
These acts are designed to cover all aspects of risk for a new plant variety. The Canadian 
Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is responsible for enforcement of the first three acts, 
under direction of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agri-Food. Health Canada is responsible 
for enforcing the Food and Drugs Act and the safety assessments for all new foods and 
drugs, including those developed using biotechnology. For products not covered under 
the above laws, Environment Canada has responsibility under the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Agency.  
The regulations are based on science and scientific evidence and focus on the product 
rather than the process of development. Plants with Novel Traits (PNT) are defined as 
those that have been modified via genetic engineering or mutagenesis or do not have a 
history of safe consumption in Canada. However, a plant is not a PNT if it has an rDNA 
insertion but does not demonstrate a new trait; in such a case it would not be subject to 
regulation.  
A ‘novel trait’ in respect of seed, means a seed that  
a) has been intentionally selected, created or introduced into a distinct, 
stable population of cultivated seed of the same species through a specific 
genetic change, and 
b) based on valid scientific rationale, is not substantially equivalent, in 
terms of its specific use and safety both fro the environment and for human 
health, to any characteristic of a distinct, stable population of cultivated 
seed of the same species in Canada, having regard to weediness potential, 
gene flow, plant pest potential, impact on non-target organisms and impact 
on biodiversity (Moran et al, 2009; pg. 6; citing the Seeds Regulation, 
1996). 
The CFIA states that a plant with novel trait “covers products that have not been 
previously available for sale in Canada, have been substantially modified, or are produced 
by a new process (National Farmers Union, 2013).  
The Seed Act tends to be the first point of regulation and looks to ensure that any new 
cultivars are of at least equal quality to those in place. PNTs go through a more rigorous 
regulatory process than others, requiring field trials that usually last 3 years. The CFIA is 
the primary agency assigned to evaluating PNTs, receiving a dossier of data from the 
producer of the PNT regarding quality, disease rating data, and performance 
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comparisons. A committee of the CFIA (one of 21 recommending committees) assesses 
the data to determine whether the product is novel, and therefore a PNT, or if the values 
fall within the limits of previous products. The other agencies involved would be 
Environment Canada and Health Canada. 
There are four options for approval of a PNT:  
• national approval;  
• regional approval (i.e. Western province versus Quebec and Ontario growing 
region;  
• contract registration for varieties that must be segregated from others for safety 
purposes; and  
• interim registration for a fixed duration for approval of the specific variety. 
Most new herbicide tolerant varieties are treated as PNTs regardless of whether they 
were developed using the rDNA process or traditional breeding. They are assessed 
according to whether the plant can become a weed or be invasive to natural habitats; the 
potential for gene flow to wild relatives; the potential to become a pest; the potential 
impact of a plant or its gene products on non-target species; the potential impact on 
biodiversity. All plants must have full approval for environmental safety, and must obtain 
both feed and food approval if they are to be used in either of those contexts. The CFIA 
takes the lead on most of the evaluation process, and Health Canada takes specific steps 
regarding any plants to be used as either food or with pharmaceutical properties. 
The Health Canada guidelines (2006) state that if a novel food is derived from a plant 
which is being investigated by the CFIA for environmental release or animal feed, Health 
Canada should be notified because of equivalent environmental assessment 
requirements. According to these guidelines, “to increase harmonization and reduce 
unnecessary delays and conflicting decisions, the CFIA and Health Canada have 
developed a formalized process to coordinate the determination of novelty for new plant 
varieties or foods and feeds derived from these plants under the regulatory provision of 
these Acts,” (pg. 14). When a new request is brought forward for an opinion on the novelty 
of a plant and its feed and food products, the three agencies will review the case in order 
to analyze the different factors that can influence its status. If a plant is declared a PNT, 
then its food and feed products are also likely to be seen as novel. It is also possible, 
however, to declare a plant not novel but still see its food and feed products as novel, or 
to have a plant declared a PNT but not have its food and feed products seen as novel 
because of a history of safe use in other environments.  
Bottlenecks exists in the process in that, because it is carried out on a case by case basis, 
the demand for data is not set and producers are never sure what will demanded from 
them. Moreover, they see instances of regulatory creep in that more and more data are 
being demanded because genetic detection techniques are improving – therefore the 
scientific tools, rather than actual risk exposure, may be driving the demand for data used 
in reports. The Health Canada Guidelines (2006) also note that post-market monitoring 
requirements are also decided on a case by case basis – providing a further potential 
opening for “regulatory creep”. 
Other points of criticism relate to the concept of substantial equivalence, used by 
agencies to determine whether something is a new product or not, judged on a safety 
basis in comparison with national products and also international products in similar 
settings. If a GM crop is determined as substantially equivalent then it can pre-empt much 
of the need for safety and regulatory analysis; in other words, if a plant is determined to 
be substantially equivalent, then it does not have to go through the full battery of safety 
tests that it would otherwise have to go through if it was deemed completely a Plant with 
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Novel Traits; it would only have to undergo testing for the specific aspect that was seen as 
non-equivalent or truly novel. According to the National Farmers’ Union (2013) substantial 
equivalence is defined as “the equivalence of a novel trait within a particular plant species, 
in terms of its specific use and safety to the environment and human health, to those in 
that same species that are in use and generally considered safe in Canada, based on 
valid scientific rationale.” In 2001, however, an expert panel critically identified two 
definitions of substantial equivalence:  
(i) A GM organism is “substantially equivalent” if, on the basis of reasoning 
analogous to that used in the assessment of varieties derived through 
conventional breeding, it is assumed that no changes have been introduced into 
the organism other than those directly attributable to the novel gene. If the latter 
are demonstrated to be harmless, the GM organism is predicted to have no 
greater adverse impacts upon health or environment than its traditional 
counterpart. We refer to this interpretation as the decision threshold equivalent.  
(ii) A GM organism is “substantially equivalent” if rigorous scientific analysis 
establishes that, despite all changes introduced into the organism as a result of the 
introduction of novel genes, the organism poses no more risk to health or to the 
environment than does its conventional counterpart. We refer to this interpretation 
as the safety standard interpretation (Royal Society of Canada, 2001).  
The Royal Society stated that while the second definition would be their preferred one, the 
first definition has tended to be used by committees in determining whether a plan need 
undergo the full battery of safety testing. Smyth and McHughen (2007)criticised the Royal 
Society’s position, stating that “there is no scientific reason to suppose that plants 
developed using rDNA are any more risky than plants developed using other 
technologies; and second, science cannot prove anything is safe,” (pg. 218). 
Criticisms have also been made of the transparency of the process where the scientific 
community or members of the public cannot review details of the evaluation process or 
the data used. The public cannot verify that the information requirements are in fact being 
met through the regulatory process. The importance of this is emphasized by the potential 
for conflicts of interest in the organizational structure and operational practices of the 
CFIA, its goal being to regulate products and also to promote the development of an 
internationally competitive biotechnology sector. Furthermore, Agriculture Canada invests 
$60M in biotech R&D each year, including collaboration with companies conducting field 
tests under investment-matching initiatives, which if successful means that Agriculture 
Canada can benefit from some of the royalties resulting from the R&D. 
The committee discussions determining whether a plant is seen as a PNT or not may 
involve lobbying amongst the different stakeholders at the table given that, once a plant is 
classed as a PNT, the high cost of regulatory checks and tests, including field tests, will 
restrict the ability of any body other than a large firm to meet the regulatory requirements 
and market the product. Researchers will thus try to avoid a PNT designation if possible. 
Having said that, “to date, in Canada, most commercialized genetically engineered plants 
have been considered to contain novel traits, and therefore have been assessed for 
safety,” (Smyth and McHughe, 2007; pg. 220). The safety assessment following a PNT 
designation goes through Stage 1 (contained use); Stage 2 (confined research field trials); 
Stage 3 (Safety Assessments), and the subsequent presentation of a decision document 
from the CFIA and other agencies. 
2.2.2 US regulatory system 
The US regulatory system is based on principles originally set by the White House 
Administrations from the 1980s onward (both parties) which state that policy should be (i) 
product-based; (ii) presume low risk from genetic modification; and (iii) review GM 
products under existing federal standards. The US position is thus very different from that 
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of the EU in that it rejects strict regulation on the grounds that it would not be based on 
verifiable scientific risk, and proposes that the technology should be allowed to flourish in 
the absence of proven hazards. However, there is no definition of scientific risk, and 
agencies are directed to refrain from hypothesizing what this risk may be or “affirmatively 
searching for safety or environmental concerns”. The National Research Council in 1987 
stated that: there is no evidence that unique hazards exist in use of rDNA or movement of 
genes between unrelated organisms; risks associated with rDNA are same as those of 
other methods; assessment of risks should be based on the nature of the organism and 
the environment into which it is introduced, not by the modification methods. Regulation 
would occur for the organism itself and/or for products derived from the organism. Much of 
the onus is on the private developer of a new crop to ensure that it is safe, relying on 
prudence and fear of liability and litigation.  
The political and economic motivation behind the governance approach was to promote 
the industry’s growth and minimise the regulatory burden on the assumption that effective 
industry and scientific self-regulation could preclude burdensome or inhibitory legislation. 
In the President’s Council “Report on National Biotechnology Policy” (Bush 
administration), federal agencies were seen as gatekeepers to the development and use 
of biotechnology, and in order to avoid inhibiting growth government should presume 
minimal risk in the absence of contrary evidence. 
The agencies responsible for GM regulation are:  
• Food and Drug Administration for food, feed, food additives and veterinary drugs; 
is it safe to eat? 
• US Department of Agriculture for plant pests, plants, and veterinary biologics; is it 
safe to grow? and  
• the Environmental Protection Agency for on microbial/plant pesticides, new uses of 
existing pesticides, and novel microorganisms; is it safe for the environment, safe 
for new use with a companion herbicide? (Marden, 2003; pg. 739). 
The FDA is the main agency involved in GM regulation, charged with ensuring the safety 
of human food and animal feeds. Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FFDCA) the onus is on the manufacturer to ensure that the product is not adulterated or 
misbranded. If a food contains a ’novel‘ ingredient, then a company must submit a petition 
for approval which must contain scientific evidence of its safety and show that there is 
’reasonable certainty’ that it is safe. Alternatively, an ingredient can be Generally 
Recognized As Safe (GRAS), which means the substance must be ’demonstrated to be 
generally recognized as safe among the community of scientific experts knowledgeable 
about such substances’. With a GRAS designation the lengthy food review process can 
be avoided. As a result, firms must decide whether they wish to submit a novel food 
petition or try to demonstrate that they are GRAS. FDA policy set in 1992 presumed that 
most GM products were GRAS, but it was also subject to a voluntary pre-market 
consultation process to assure the public that safeguards were in place. However, this is 
different from the FDA’s position on other conventional food ingredients, which is more 
conservative and does not presume safety even if it was present in the food supply in 
other countries or in different formats. 
The FDA strongly encourages firms to follow its voluntary consultation process in 
developing a GM food product and recommends including: a description of the 
applications of the ingredient or uses of the food; information concerning the source and 
identities of the genetic material; the intended technical effect of the modification on the 
food; information on any suspected allergenicity; and comparison with the natural variety. 
The voluntary nature of this process has meant that firms have on occasion refused to 
volunteer information requested by the FDA and this relatively soft touch position has led 
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to criticisms. However, it has been supported by the US courts that have deferred to the 
FDA’s expertise in citing what data is necessary to deem something safe for consumption.  
The USDA took an initial position which was more precautionary than the FDA, stating 
that existing regimes may not be adequate for GM products and that some GM products 
could be considered plant pests, be subject to the Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA), and 
therefore have to pass through a ’mandatory pre-release permitting process’. The trigger 
in this case would be the process of genetic modification, although the USDA argues that 
it only applies to those plants that could be reasonably expected to be plant pests.  
Criteria used to determine exemption from the more onerous process under the FPPA 
include:  
• the plant is corn, cotton, potato, soybean, tobacco or tomato;  
• genetic material is integrated in a stable manner;  
• the function of the genetic material is known and does not result in plant disease;  
• genetic material does not encode infectious or pharmaceutical substances;  
• genetic material does not pose plant virus-related risks; and  
• genetic material is not from a known animal or human pathogen.  
The producers must inform the USDA that the GM product meets the above criteria, 
compiling significant dossiers to do so, leading to Environmental Assessments and 
Environmental Impact Statements, which can then lead to deregulation. The USDA have 
allowed these criteria for any plant (not just those named) and expected that most GM 
plant products would be able to meet those criteria. In addition, the USDA introduced a 
clause that any closely related plants to a GM plant already accepted as non-regulated, 
would also be allowed through; however, ‘closely related’ was not defined. 
Like the Canadian system the USDA shows some conflicts of interest because the 
USDA’s Agriculture Research Service and Agricultural Marketing Service are also 
involved in developing and marketing internationally US GM products. The Clinton 
administration acknowledged this conflict of interest but with the change in administration 
no action resulted. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) considers new plants and whether they 
produce a pesticide. GM products would be investigated based on their production of 
such pesticides. The EPA’s authority would only prevail where the product has 
pesticidal properties; otherwise the USDA or FDA would be in charge. The EPA would 
use existing regulatory structures to assess new products, based on changes in plants 
that are intended to give them pesticidal properties, and EPA approval is temporary, 
requiring re-registration at specified intervals. EPA approval does not remove the need 
for USDA de-regulation. Moreover, many of the EPA’s permits and registration of products 
are dependent on their being clear contract obligations between the firms and the 
potential users of the new plant in terms of how they should be planted and controlled 
within the environment. 
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3 GM CROP CASE STUDIES – BT11 AND GA21` 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this case study report, we provide a description and analysis of the risk-assessment 
process and regulatory decisions that were made in Europe regarding Syngenta’s 
applications to cultivate Bt11 maize and GA21 maize. It offers insights into the risk 
assessment – policy gap (absence of clear policy/regulatory objectives such that risk 
assessors have little or no ability to derive robust assessment endpoints) and consider 
how this has reduced the effectiveness of decision-making processes. These case studies 
explore the relationship between changes in scientific uncertainty and subsequent policy 
decisions, and illustrate how scientific risk-assessment and the formal regulatory process 
(which in the case of Bt11 has evolved and changed substantially since the original 
application for cultivation was submitted), has not been sufficient to reach a final decision, 
as the broader political environment for GMOs in Europe has stalled the approval process 
for the product.  
In Section 3.2, we describe the Bt11 product and provide a history of the regulatory 
process and identify some of the key issues relevant to the risk assessment – policy gap. 
As will be shown, the Bt11 case study is unique when compared to other GMOs in terms 
of the approval process. In particular, the initial application submission predated the 
existence of EFSA, so the product has been subject to a number of different regulatory 
regimes and has had to adapt to the emergence of new regulatory guidelines and 
protocols. Furthermore, Bt11 is similar to other Bt products which are or have been placed 
on the market in the EU. Thus a body of supporting data on the history of safe use of such 
products is available. This case study provides an illustrative example of how scientific 
risk-assessment can became entangled with broader policy-related concerns.  
In section 3.3, we describe the GA21 product; again providing a history of the regulatory 
process and key issues relevant to the risk-assessment policy gap. This case study 
highlights two main challenges. First, a lack of parameters as to what constitutes sufficient 
and necessary data to satisfy reviewers, despite agreed upon methodologies and 
scientific process. Second, a lack of agreement upon what constitutes sufficient evidence 
in studies to demonstrate safety and minimize risk, although this also is tied to parameters 
of data. We see these challenges reflected in the responses and questions posed by 
EFSA towards Syngenta’s application, as well as EFSA’s responses to member country 
inquiries – the EFSA approach seems to reflect a scientific/objective view, but one that is 
wrestling with the two challenges above. The challenges are also reflected by member 
state inquiries and the disparities amongst member states in how they go about 
evaluating the submission. 
The case study will also highlight the very long timelines for approval, despite the formal 
six month limit imposed by EFSA, due to the “clock stopping” when formal questions and 
requests for information are submitted through EFSA to Syngenta. This raises the 
question of how member state questions and opinions filter through EFSA to formal 
question submissions Syngenta must deal with, and how these member state questions 
may, intentionally or not, play a role in delays. 
Section 3.4 reviews the regulatory/policy process and considers the future for cultivation 
of these particular products within the EU. Data that informed these case studies were 
derived from published reports, peer-reviewed articles, material provided by Syngenta, 
and a small number of interviews (7) with key Syngenta personnel and other experts, as 
well as information that was collected from a two-day on-site visit to Syngenta (Jealott’s 
Hill), which included a number of recorded meetings with Syngenta scientists and 
regulatory affairs experts.  
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3.2 The Bt11 Case Study 
The genetically modified insect resistant Bt11 maize provides protection against specific 
Lepidopteran pests, and also contains a gene that provides tolerance to the herbicide 
glufosinate. In the initial filing to the French authorities in May 1996 (submitted at the time 
by Sandoz Seeds), which conducted the first scientific assessment (Notification number 
C/F/96.05.10), the company anticipated that the seed could replace existing varieties of 
maize in conventional agriculture. At the time it was already approved by the USDA, the 
US-FDA and the Canadian CFIA. It was approved later that year by the US-EPA, Health 
Canada and the Japanese authorities. Bt11 field maize was later approved in 1998 for 
import of food and feed use in the EU under Directive 90/220/EEC.5  
Two genes are expressed within the Bt11 derived maize lines. A truncated Cry1Ab (Bt 
toxin) gene (which is similar to that expressed by the MON810 product) produces the Bt 
protein, which provides tolerance to Lepidopteran insect pests, such as the European 
corn borer Ostrinia nubilalis. The pat gene encodes the phosphinothricin-N-
acetyltransferase enzyme, which provides tolerance to glufosinate ammonium herbicides. 
The genes encoding the genetic traits were inserted into the genome of the maize plants 
and then, through traditional breeding methods, crossed into additional maize lines.  
3.2.1. History of the Regulatory Process for Bt11 Cultivation 
The original application to cultivate Bt11 was submitted to the French Competent 
Authority (CA) in 1996 under Directive 90/220/EEC, which at the time regulated any 
environmental release of GMOs within the EU. In 1998, Syngenta (then Novartis) were 
requested to re-submit the dossier to the French authorities, because a new French 
Biosafety Commission had been formed. In 1999, the dossier received a positive opinion 
from France but, as a result of Member States’ objections, the file was transmitted to the 
Scientific Committee for Plants (one of the predecessors of EFSA). On 30 November 
2000, the SCP issued a positive opinion, stating “The Committee is of the opinion that 
there is no evidence to indicate that the placing on the market for cultivation purposes of 
maize line Bt11 and varieties derived from this line by conventional crosses between Bt11 
line and maize lines other than genetically modified ones, is likely to cause adverse 
effects on human health and the environment”.(Scientific Committee on Plants, 2000) 
The application should then have been transmitted to the Regulatory Committee for vote, 
but nothing happened for two years. The EU was in the process of revising its legislation 
on GMO marketing, and the new Directive 2001/18/EC approved in October 2002 
replaced Directive 90/220/EEC. As a consequence, Syngenta had to submit an updated 
dossier complying with the requirements of the new Directive. 
On 27 February 2003, the French Biosafety Commission issued a positive advice 
regarding the updated dossier, in accordance with the procedure set out under Article 14 
of Directive 2001/18/EC. The overall conclusion of the report was that there was no 
scientific evidence to indicate that the placing on the market of the Zea mays L. line Bt11 
posed any risk to human and animal health or the environment for the requested 
cultivation uses. It stated: “it might be considered that, according to the present 
knowledge, the placing on the market of Bt11 maize does not present a greater risk to 
human health or the environment than any other variety of maize. The updated version of 
the dossier confirms the initial assessment”. 
On 7 July 2003, the updated dossier was transmitted to the EU-Commission and to the 
other Member States, for review. The dossiers were eventually passed over to the newly 
established EFSA (set up in 2002) for its official scientific opinion on environmental and 
human health effects of the product, given that a number of member states had 
                                                
5 Notification C/GB/96/M4/1 
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questioned the original evidence/data presented by Syngenta, which had been approved 
by the French CA.  
Syngenta’s updated application document, including the required Environmental Risk 
Assessment (ERA), provided scientific evidence to suggest there would be no significant 
and detrimental impact on human/animal health or the environment. 
1. In comparisons between Bt11 maize and the unmodified plant, no differences 
apart from tolerance to Lepidopteran insect pests and glufosinate ammonium 
herbicide were identified. 
2. In terms of mode/rate of reproduction, seed production of the GM maize lines and 
hybrids were observed during two field trials in France (1994 and 1995) and no 
difference was found between the GM plants and non-GM controls.  
3. Dissemination of maize occurs exclusively through seed, and maize cannot 
survive without human assistance due to past selection during the crop’s evolution. 
Seed dispersal of individual kernels does not occur naturally because of the 
structures of the ‘ears’ of maize. The GM traits that have been introduced have 
shown no influence on reproductive morphology so no change in seed 
dissemination should be expected.  
4. Survivability – establishment in the natural environment of a maize population is 
highly unlikely because disseminated maize rarely grows due to competition with 
other plants, and the modified traits do not fundamentally change this 
characteristic.  
5. Gene transfer – Maize has no wild relatives in the EU and dissemination of the trait 
by pollen is only possible to other cultivated maize plants. Furthermore, if this 
occurred, it would only constitute a fraction of the harvest from neighbouring fields. 
There is no reported evidence that intact gene transfer occurs from a plant species 
to micro-organisms in the field situation.  
6. Human health – food safety of Bt11 was evaluated in the framework of the dossier 
UK/C/96/M4/1, regarding import and food/feed use of Bt11 as well as for the 
notification under the EU Novel Food regulation. No harmful effects were 
identified.  
7. Environment – The Cry1Ab protein is highly specific to certain Lepidopteran pests 
and has no deleterious effects on non-target organisms. The modified maize does 
not interact with the environment in a way different from non-modified maize, 
except for tolerance to Lepidopteran pests. A large number of field trials conducted 
since 1992 with the Bt11 maize and its progeny have revealed no significant 
difference between the GM and non-GM varieties.  
It should be noted at this point that the Bt11 product is perhaps unique, and certainly 
different to our other case study GA21, in that there has been a lot of independent 
research on Bt maize relevant both to the safety of food/feed and environmental impact 
relevant to the ERA. Although there was not a great deal of third-party data in 1996 when 
the application was first submitted, subsequent data did provide confidence for regulators, 
although this was not a formal part of the assessment, as the specific details on these 
external studies are often not published. Also, as the product has been grown in the 
United States and many other territories, there is an extensive amount of international 
data related to safety and environmental impact of cultivation. So this is very different, 
according to the Syngenta representatives we interviewed, from newer products, where 
there is less extensive data related to cultivation or history of safe use 
The French CA, as already noted, accepted the evidence presented by Syngenta and 
gave a favourable opinion to the European Commission and Member States. At this point, 
it appeared that there was a high degree of scientific certainty that the Bt11 product was 
safe and would have no deleterious impact on the environment or human/animal health. 
However, following the favourable decision by the French authorities, other member 
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states raised a number of objections/questions about the status of the scientific evidence 
and many implied that there was uncertainty about the risk evidence.  
3.2.2 Objections by Other Member States and EC Response  
The CAs of other member states raised a number of objections to the Bt11 product being 
approved for cultivation and placed on the market, during the 3 month consultation period 
in 2003. The first period is 60 days, and then once the company had responded there is 
another 45 days to resolve any questions. If objections remain after the 45 day period, the 
file is passed to the Scientific Committee, which in 2004 was EFSA. The principal 
objections (relating predominantly to the ERA) were the potential adverse effects on soil 
organisms and arthropods, and the long-term effects on the environment of the Bt-toxin, 
which is contained in the product. The Commission subsequently considered that the 
following key issues should be addressed: 
1. direct and indirect effects of the Cry1Ab toxin on non-target organisms, specifically 
soil biota, arthropods, butterflies, and other invertebrates;  
2. further data on the effects and persistence of Bt toxin in soil;  
3. more information on the general surveillance and monitoring of non-target effects; 
4. concerns about potential harm to endangered Lepidopteran species and the 
possible need to protect endangered butterfly species; 
5. potentially altered lignin contents and the biodegradability of plant litter as well as 
long-term persistence of the Cry1Ab protein.  
Table 1 below categorises the types of questions/objections by country.  
 
Table 1: Categorisation of questions from other national authorities after the 60 day period 
in 2003 (Note the EU consisted of 15 Member States (MS) in 2003) 
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Austria 5 0 1 3 1 
Belgium 10 1 0 0 9 
Denmark 3 0 0 3 0 
Finland 3 2 0 1 0 
Germany 19 5 1 10 3 
Ireland 1 0 0 1 0 
Italy 14 3 0 7 4 
Spain 1 0 0 1 0 
Sweden 10 1 0 9 0 
Netherlands 3 0 0 3 0 
UK 4 1 0 3 0 
Total 73 13 2 41 17 
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3.2.3 EFSA Opinion (2005) 
EFSA (2005) published its opinion on Bt11 for cultivation on 20 April, 2005 (it had started 
its formal evaluation on 18 March 2004, after Syngenta had provided an updated dossier 
that included information required for the new guidelines). The EFSA GMO panel 
considered the initial application, additional information provided by Syngenta (which 
included a full ERA of the pat gene in connection with the possible use of the 
complementary herbicide), and objections, comments and questions submitted by the 
member states.  
The scientific assessment included: 
• Examination of the DNA insert in Bt11 maize 
• Nature and safety of the newly expressed proteins produced by the transgenic 
plants with respect to toxicology and allergenicity  
• Comparative analysis of agronomic traits and composition 
• Safety of the whole product 
• Nutritional and environmental assessment, including monitoring plan. 
Although the pat gene for glufosinate ammonium tolerance was not considered to be 
commercially relevant in the EU, the EFSA panel believed that you could not rule out the 
possibility of farmers growing Bt11 maize with this additional application in mind. 
Therefore, EFSA decided that the ERA and post-marketing environmental monitoring 
(PMEM) should also consider direct and indirect impacts of the herbicide tolerance trait. 
Syngenta had to make a clear statement that it was intended purely as a marker gene and 
that it was not in the scope of the application to use glufosinate on the crop. According to 
Syngenta, one of the reports they had to submit to EFSA was an evaluation of what the 
likely impact of illegitimate glufosinate use might be on Bt11. Syngenta had to conduct this 
assessment, even though it wasn’t technically within the scope of the legislation. Sweden 
was one of the member states that had a particular concern about glufosinate. The 
European Commission has recently announced restrictions for the use of glufosinate, 
which will be effective from November 13, 2013. The active ingredient will only be 
authorised “for band or spot application at rates not exceeding 750 g ai/ha (treated 
surface) per application, with a maximum of two applications per year.”6  
Another key issue for this product emerged on 23 March, 2005, when information was 
submitted to EFSA on the inadvertent release in the United States of a non-authorised 
GM maize line, called Bt10, and its unintended export as Bt11 for research purposes to 
Spain and France. The GMO Panel immediately sought information from Syngenta to 
confirm the risk assessment of Bt11 would not be compromised by the unintended 
presence of Bt10 maize. Syngenta responded that material used in the safety studies was 
Bt11 and that it was able to identify and confirm from the Syngenta specific material codes 
the studies to assess the Bt11 safety were indeed conducted with Bt11 maize.  
The substantive response of EFSA to Syngenta’s application, and member states’ 
objections (focusing on the environmental risk assessment for cultivation and post 
marketing surveillance), can be summarised as follows: 
1. Unintended effects on plant fitness due to genetic medication: Maize is highly 
domesticated and not able to survive in the environment without cultivation, and 
maize plants are not winter hardy in many areas of Europe. They have lost their 
ability to release seeds from the cob and they do not occur outside cultivated or 
disturbed land. EFSA determined that the Bt11 maize has no altered survival, 
multiplication or dissemination characteristics except in the presence of glufosinate 
                                                
6 See http://news.agropages.com/News/NewsDetail---9598.htm 
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ammonium. The ‘likelihood of unintended environmental effects due to the 
establishment and spread of Bt11 maize will be no different from that of 
traditionally bred maize’ (EFSA, 2005, p. 15). 
2. Potential for Gene Transfer: In terms of plant to bacteria gene transfer, given the 
nature and origin of the genes and the lack of selective pressure in the intestinal 
tract and/or the environment, the likelihood of horizontal gene transfer conferring 
selective advantages or increased fitness on micro-organisms is limited. It is 
therefore unlikely that genes from Bt11 maize will become established in the 
genomes of microorganisms, and if they did, it would not negatively impact on 
animal or human health or the environment.   
3. Interactions between GM plant and target organisms: The panel considered the 
evolution of resistance in target pests as an environmental and agronomic 
concern. It concluded that large-scale cultivation of Bt11 maize over several years 
will increase the selection pressure on corn borers, which might result in 
resistance to the Bt toxin. However, the panel stated this risk was low as under 
field conditions and several years of cultivation no resistance has so far been 
reported.  
4. Interactions between GM plant and non-target organisms: Reduction in prey either 
by cultivation of Bt maize or by insecticides may negatively affect the food source 
of certain predators, but the Panel concluded that current knowledge on toxicity 
and exposure give sufficient scientific evidence that Bt maize poses no risk to 
predators. Field studies confirmed that predator and parasitoid abundances and 
biocontrol functions are similar in Bt and non-Bt fields. EFSA also documented that 
a range of lepidopteran species may be affected by Bt toxins and some may be 
present in maize fields. However, it concluded that exposure to the toxins is 
restricted to those consuming the Bt plant or its products and in Europe maize is 
not a significant food source for endemic Lepidoptera.   
5. Interaction with abiotic environment: Assumptions had been made that Bt toxin 
might persist and accumulate in soil during cultivation of Bt maize and that as a 
result direct and indirect impacts of the toxin or Bt maize (e.g. potential increase of 
lignin content in combination with a possible delay in decomposition) on non-target 
organisms and soil function should be considered. The Panel, however, concluded 
that this would be a low risk.  
6. Impact of cultivation and harvesting techniques: The panel considered that the 
presence of the pat gene and the use of glufosinate ammonium are not likely to 
give an increased impact on biodiversity in most situations. Therefore, it concluded 
that case specific monitoring regarding any consequences due to the application of 
glufosinate ammonium in combination with the cultivation of Bt maize is not 
required. However, the panel recommended that observation of general weed 
abundance and diversity should be included as part of a general surveillance plan.  
EFSA concluded that the data and information available at the time for Bt11 maize 
adequately addressed all of the outstanding questions raised by member states. It 
reiterated the original conclusion of the French Competent Authority that Bt11 maize will 
not have an adverse effect on human and animal health or the environment in the context 
of Syngenta’s proposed use. Again, EFSA seemed to accept that the level of scientific 
uncertainty surrounding Bt11 was low, as were any potential environmental impacts. 
Nevertheless, in terms of the Post Marketing Environmental Monitoring (PMEM), a 
number of further issues and recommendations were raised by Member States, which are 
summarised below: 
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1. A detailed monitoring plan is required that includes both general and case-specific 
monitoring, and a more detailed insect resistance management plan was 
demanded.  
2. The implications of the presence and use of the pat gene, in addition to the cry1Ab 
gene, should be considered in the PMEM plan. 
3. More information on general surveillance and monitoring of non-target effects was 
needed. 
4. A considerable modification of the case-specific monitoring plan to take into 
account the additional requirements for the environmental risk assessment is 
requested.  
In response, the EFSA panel considered these additional issues, critically examined the 
monitoring plan initially submitted by Syngenta, and requested improvements and 
clarification from Syngenta. 
The panel made the following key conclusions: 
1. General aspects of monitoring: EFSA considered that the environmental 
monitoring plan submitted by Syngenta complied with the requirements defined in 
Directive 2001/18/EC, the guidance notes to Annex V11 and the Guidance 
document provided by EFSA (EFSA, 2004) 
2. Interplay between environmental risk assessment and monitoring: Since the ERA 
suggested that the development of resistant corn borer populations could be 
induced by cultivation of Bt11, case-specific monitoring of resistance development 
in corn borers is required (Syngenta had indeed provided such a monitoring plan). 
The panel also considered whether the abundance of non-target Lepidoptera in or 
close to maize fields should be monitored, but concluded this was not practical or 
necessary. The ERA identified no risks specifically linked to Bt maize fields, the 
influence of Bt11 on variability of abundance of Lepidoptera was expected to be 
minimal compared with other factors - such as general agricultural management, 
insecticide use on neighbouring fields, weed abundance, climate etc. – and it 
would be difficult to compare populations of Lepidoptera in conventional maize 
fields (which may use insecticides) with Bt11 fields. The Panel also agreed with 
the ERA that no adverse effects on other non-target organisms are anticipated and 
therefore should not be included in the case-specific monitoring. It also considered 
the spread of transgenes to be not relevant for environmental monitoring since 
sexually compatible relatives of maize are not present in the EU. In terms of the 
risks specific to the pat gene, again the Panel agreed with the ERA that there was 
no identified risk. So case-specific monitoring was required only for monitoring 
insect resistance.  
3. General Surveillance: The panel welcomed Syngenta’s use of farmer 
questionnaires in the surveillance process, but suggested some modifications. 
First, it should allow for both general farm information as well as field-specific 
information for several fields when more than one field of a specific farmer is 
included in the monitoring. Second, the questionnaire sent to the farmers for the 
year(s) after the Bt maize cultivation needs to be adapted for the monitoring of the 
specific crops (maize or different) that follow the Bt11 maize cultivation.  
3.2.4 Summary of EFSA’s Conclusions: 
Overall, the EFSA GMO panel considered all the scientific evidence and concluded that 
Bt11 maize would have similar impacts to those of comparable non-GM maize cultivars on 
the environment. The only adverse effect identified was the possibility of resistance to 
Cry1Ab protein evolving in corn borers exposed to Bt11 maize following cultivation for 
some years. However, the panel accepted Syngenta’s monitoring plan for this specific 
risk.  
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From data provided by Syngenta, the Panel concluded there was no evidence to suggest 
that Bt10 material was present in the Bt11 maize used for biosafety studies. Therefore, 
the risk assessment had not been compromised by the presence of Bt10 maize, which 
was a concern expressed by some Member States and NGOs.  
The EFSA GMO panel was of the opinion that there is no evidence to indicate that placing 
on the market of maize line Bt11 and derived products is likely to cause adverse effects to 
human or animal health or the environment for its proposed use.  
3.2.5 EC Technical Meeting Convened in 2006  
Following the publication of EFSA’s 2005 opinion, the European Commission convened a 
technical meeting with national competent authorities on 19 June 2006 to address any 
remaining objections of Member States in light of EFSA’s opinion. Also discussed was an 
outstanding cultivation application for TC1507(a DOW product). Most of the outstanding 
objections expressed related to the potential effects of Bt11 and TC1507 on non-target 
organisms and in particular Lepidopteran species and to post-market monitoring 
processes (EFSA, 2008). Certain Member States did not accept EFSA’s previous 
scientific opinions and claimed their concerns were not being adequately addressed. We 
might speculate here that political objections wrapped up in the language of scientific 
uncertainty were related to the lack of transparent policy objectives.  
The Commission requested that EFSA complement its previous opinions on Bt11 by 
providing more specific information concerning Lepidoptera referred to in the EFSA 
Opinion of 19 January. EFSA was also asked to recommend whether more precise risk 
management measures (such as monitoring plans) including specific scientific research 
studies on non-target organisms and taking account of geographical regions, should be 
implemented. EFSA adopted the Annex complementing its opinion on non-target 
organisms on the 7 November, 2006 (published 21 November 2006). In this Annex 
(EFSA, 2006), EFSA concluded that the information for Bt11 and TC1507 clearly 
addresses the objections and questions raised by Member States, and confirmed that 
Bt11 and TC1507 are unlikely to have adverse effects on the environment or 
animal/human health.  
Reading EFSA’s responses, one can sense a degree of frustration that the evidence is 
being continually questioned and previous opinions undermined. This has been a 
recurrent issue throughout the approval process for Bt11, and suggests tension between 
risk-assessment, scientific evidence and politics, as discussed in the final section.  
3.2.6 EC Postpones Decision on Approval of Bt11 Based On 11 New Publications 
and Invocation of the Precautionary Principle (2007)  
In 2007, the Commission highlighted areas where it believed there was continuing 
scientific uncertainty around Bt11 and concluded that in light of the precautionary 
principle, Bt11 should not be approved for cultivation. It stated: 
‘…there are still serious indications that the cultivation of Zea mays L. line Bt11 could (i) 
adversely affect non-target organisms, such as particular species of butterflies, (ii) 
increase the presence of parasitoids in caterpillars and thus modify the food chains, (iii) 
generate an uneven concentration of the Bt-toxin on plants of the same locations, (iv) 
influence the composition of the microbial community and (v) lead to the persistence of Bt-
toxin in aquatic environments. As the studies indicate that the spread of these potential 
effects in the environment would be wide, the concentration of the Bt-toxin uneven, the 
affected organisms and eco-systems considerably diverse and their potential damage on 
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the environment irreversible, it is not possible to establish appropriate management 
measures which would effectively mitigate the potential damage on the environment.’7.  
The Commission cited 11 papers that had been published since November 2006, when 
EFSA published its scientific opinion, that it believed cast doubt on the long-term 
environmental safety of Bt crops (Abbott & Schiermeier, 2007). Stavros Dimas (EC 
environment commissioner) stated that he planned to reject Syngenta’s application due to 
potential adverse effects on the environment, which clearly undermined EFSAs previous 
opinions.  
In response to this decision, on November 28th, 2007, the European Federation of 
Biotechnology (EFB) took direct action to oppose what it considered ‘unscientific 
approaches’ to GMO regulation by the Commission. Members of EFB handed over an 
open letter to Stavros Dimas at the EC, responding to the draft decisions to reject two Bt 
maize products, including Bt11 (Hodgson, 2008). The full EFB letter is included in Section 
3.4.  
In summary, EFB considered that the draft decisions had no scientific basis and seemed 
to be made without considering the consequences for Europe or the fact that similar 
maize varieties have been growing in Europe for the past 9 years with high adoption rates 
with no adverse environmental effects and in coexistence with conventional and organic 
farming. Furthermore, concerning the scientific studies (11 publications) contained in the 
draft decisions that claim to demonstrate environmental risks presented by Bt maize, EFB 
claimed that nine out of the eleven publications actually confirmed the environmental 
safety of Bt maize cultivation and in fact did not identify any environmental risk with 
respect to the cultivation of Bt maize in the EU.  
3.2.7 Request from EC for a Further Scientific Review and EFSA’s Response (2008)  
In a letter dated 24 July, 2008, the EC requested that EFSA’s GM panel review previous 
scientific opinions on Bt11 and 1507 in light of the 11 scientific publications cited in the 
Commission’s decision not to approve cultivation, as well as any other relevant studies. 
The EFSA opinion published in October 2008 (EFSA, 2008) concluded that none of the 11 
publications reported new data for maize 1507 and only two reported new data sets for 
Bt11. For 2 other publications, it was unclear whether the experiments included Bt11 or 
1507. The remaining 7 publications dealt either exclusively with data derived from other 
GM maize, with reviews on originally published literature to conclude the risk assessment 
of transgenic plants generally, or to discuss environmental aspects of GM herbicide-
tolerant plants, so had very little relevance to these cases.  
Each publication was then discussed in detail and assessed by EFSA who stated: ‘these 
publications do not provide new information that would change previous environmental 
risk assessments – including potential long-term effects – conducted on maize Bt11 and 
1507 … Having also considered other recent scientific publications, the GMO panel 
reaffirms its previous conclusions on the environmental safety of maize Bt11 and 1507, 
expressed on 19 January, 2005, 20 April 2005 and 7 November 2006.’ (EFSA, 2008, 21) 
From our discussions with Syngenta, the company had very little involvement in this 
process. It’s the responsibility of EFSA to report back to the Commission, and in this case, 
as well as in responding to member state’s questions/objections, they did this largely 
without requesting Syngenta’s input.  
In 2009, the EC published an updated draft decision on Bt11 (D003698/01). Having 
examined the Member State objections in light of Directive 2001/18/EC, information 
submitted in the notification, and the opinion of EFSA (including its opinion on the 11 
                                                
7 Commission Decision, ENV/07/ p 6 see http://www.gmo-
compass.org/pdf/regulation/maize/Bt11_maize_draft_decision_cultivation.pdf  
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published articles), it concluded that there is no evidence to indicate that placing Bt11 on 
the market would lead to adverse effects on animal/human health or the environment. It is 
therefore not necessary to establish specific conditions for the intended use with regard to 
handling the product and protection of particular ecosystems, environments or 
geographical areas.  
3.2.8 Vote by Standing Committee and Current Status of the Bt11 Product 
On February 25, 2009 the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health of 
member states voted on the Commission’s proposed adoption of Bt11 for cultivation. In 
the final vote, 6 countries (91 votes) were in favour, 12 countries (127 votes) were 
against, while 7 countries (95 votes) abstained and two countries (32 votes) did not 
participate. As no qualified majority (which would require 255 votes) for either decision 
was achieved, the Council of Ministers would then have to vote on the proposal. However, 
during this time there was an important change in the Committee process that might 
produce a further delay in a final decision being made. Instead of the Council of Ministers, 
there is now an Appeal Committee constituted by high level officials instead of Ministers. 
While the lower level of the MS representatives might facilitate the practical work of this 
Committee, therefore speeding up the process, in case of a lack of Qualified Majority 
(which is the recurrent outcome with the GM products) the EC is not legally forced to issue 
a decision. Therefore the final approval for cultivation of a GM product might be 
postponed until the EC decides the appropriate timing.  
If the appeal committee rules against the Commission's proposed action, the Commission 
must abide by this decision. Full rules and explanation of the Appeal Committee process 
are provided at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32011Q0624%2801%29:EN:NOT  
If the original process, before the creation of the Appeal Committee in 2011, had been 
followed, and the Council of Ministers had come to the same decision as the Standing 
Committee, by law the European Commission would have had to authorise the product. 
But now, if there is no qualified majority in any sense (which many consider the most likely 
scenario), the Commission is not forced to act. It can wait until it is convenient to respond, 
thus creating an indefinite delay.  
In most cases, according to one of our interviewees, the Commission would like a 
qualified majority decision, as it probably does not want to be responsible for making the 
final decision, due to the political nature of the issue. With a small majority of votes in 
favour, it seems that the Commission does not want to make the decision to approve.   
After more than 17 years in the approval process, the Bt11 product is still without a final 
approval and it is not clear when this will now happen. One continuing stumbling block is 
the lack of agreement on the Post Marketing Monitoring Plan (PMMP). A few years ago, 
according to one of our respondents, 3 companies had insect-resistant corn and decided 
on an agreed monitoring plan for Bt maize, but the Commission rejected this. When DG 
SANCO took over the file, it recognised the benefit of the plan and decided to work with it, 
but there is still no agreed PMMP proposal from the Commission. Bt11 could have been 
approved without this PMMP agreement in the past, but now it is a formal requirement 
and this is contributing to the delays.   
3.2.9 Additional Data/Research Conducted by EFSA and Role of Syngenta 
throughout the Approval Process 
We have outlined the sequential process of approval for Bt11 and identified key areas 
where risk-assessment has become enmeshed in broader political complexities and 
uncertainties. In this section we will focus on the regulatory science that was being 
conducted within EFSA, and Syngenta, throughout this protracted approval process.  
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In our discussions with Syngenta, it was clear that throughout the 17 years in which Bt11 
has been stuck in the approval process, Syngenta has not had to provide a great deal of 
additional information from in-house studies, and has not had to conduct extensive 
additional field trials or experiments in response to comments/questions from member 
states and changes in the science and regulatory process since the emergence of EFSA. 
One of the reasons for this is that there has been a lot of independent research on Bt 
maize and its environmental impacts. Also, and perhaps more crucially, Bt11 maize has 
been cultivated on a large scale in the Americas since 1998. In addition Bt11 is very 
similar to MON810, so research data on MON810 and other similar events, such as 
Bt176, does provide evidence to support the safety of Bt11, although as already stated 
these data have not been used for formal risk assessment. Nevertheless, some of the 
comments, questions and objections member states had to MON810 would also be 
applicable to Bt11.  
EFSA took primary responsibility for responding to questions, by reviewing the literature, 
asking Syngenta for information where necessary, and in some cases developing its own 
risk-assessment methodologies. One example of this was EFSA’s development of a new 
mathematical modelling system in 2010 for MON810, which was developed further in 
2011/2012 to simulate potential adverse effects from the exposure of non-target 
Lepidoptera to maize Bt11 under hypothetical agricultural conditions within the EU, and 
provide data on factors affecting the efficacy of risk mitigation measures through the 
insect resistance management plan (EFSA, 2012). The conclusion was that the risks were 
low, but would need to be considered in the PMEM under certain conditions (sensitivity 
and occurrence of harm to non-target Lepidoptera, acreage of Bt maize and host plant 
density etc) to reduce exposure. In the 2012 paper, EFSA suggested the required 
isolation distances around protected habitats within which sources of maize Bt11 and 
MON 810 pollen should not be cultivated. General surveillance, it was suggested, should 
be used to report on any unexpected outcomes.  
So what was EFSA’s motivation to conduct its own in-house studies? In most cases, 
EFSA usually stops work once it has completed and published its scientific opinion. One 
of our interviewees suggested that the reason is partly due to the fact that this Bt11 
product has been in the system for so long and been subject to many delays, during 
which new data and evidence emerged and regulatory systems were modified. So EFSA 
found itself routinely being asked by the Commission to re-analyse data. The modelling 
was an in-house initiative of the EFSA GMO panel, as it believed it would be a useful tool 
and wanted to test it. Now any regulatory system ought to consider new relevant 
evidence. For example, if a problem is identified in an approved product, it may be 
sensible to take action to amend or revoke its registration. However, the problem in the 
case of Bt11 is the continual introduction of evidence that is irrelevant; that is, evidence 
that does not question the conclusions of previous studies or simply has no plausible 
relationship to environmental harm. Under the present system, it seems that the act of 
conducting a study on a product (or something similar), whatever its objectives or 
conclusions, is itself a reason for delay.  
3.2.10 Syngenta Field Trial Applications 
Syngenta has submitted many field trial applications since 1996, in different countries 
within the EU, but most have been conducted in Spain. For example, Syngenta submitted 
an application to conduct a field trial in one region of Spain (4 sites in Castilla-La Mancha) 
in 2008. It is a useful example to further illustrate the regulatory challenges. The purpose 
of the trial was line multiplication and to collect complementary data from Bt11 maize field 
performance8 A similar document was also submitted in 2009, but on that occasion the 
National Biosafety Commission sent Syngenta a letter requesting additional information 
                                                
8 Notification B/ES/08/29 
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on the field trial practices. In 2009, Syngenta also requested permission for a field trial of 
the stacked hybrid maize Bt11 and GA21. Interestingly, the Biosafety Commission used 
the opportunity to request additional information on the single events. In both cases, 
Syngenta responded by letter to the questions. 
In its letter, the Biosafety Commission stated that it had looked at the notifications 
B/ES/09/38 and B/ES/09/09, corresponding to field studies with genetically modified 
maize plant (Bt11 and GA21, respectively). During its meeting, the members of NBC 
agreed to focus on the following aspects: 
First, given that the objective of the field studies is the multiplication of Bt11 and 
GA21, it is assumed that the majority of plant material obtained will not be 
destroyed but rather will be gathered as whole ears of corn for later analysis. In 
this sense, the NBC considers it essential that detailed information be submitted 
regarding the precautionary methods that will be taken to avoid possible accidental 
dispersal during transport of said crops and that accidental entry into human or 
animal consumption, as well as information on the laboratories that will be 
receiving the plant material. It would be convenient, according to the NBC, to 
produce a traceability document of GM maize plants so that the receiving 
laboratory produces a document that corresponds with what it actually receives. 
The NBC would prepare a document elaborating the methods of managing risk for 
these types of cultivation field studies. 
Second, the design of the field studies should be presented, indicating the location 
of Bt11 and GA21, non-transgenic varieties, and other possible “events of 
transformation” from Syngenta on the same parcels of land. 
Third, in notification B/ES/09/38, regarding field studies for Bt11, there is no 
indication that there will be a border of various rows of conventional maize around 
the field studies; this measure is considered essential to avoid the transferral of 
genetic material. 
In its response to the letter Syngenta claimed that the characterisation and chromosome 
placements in the product had already been described. Furthermore, in the context of the 
effects on non-target organisms, Syngenta maintained that this is not an issue, and 
referred back to EFSA’s 2008 evaluation and review of the latest studies, which supported 
this view.   
This is another example where Syngenta must refer regulatory authorities to earlier 
studies and previous evaluations to demonstrate that current questions are largely 
irrelevant or have already been answered.  
3.3 The GA21 Case Study 
Maize GA21 was developed to be tolerant to the herbicide glyphosate with the 
introduction of a gene for the modified enzyme 5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3 phosphate 
synthase (mEPSPS). Glyphosate is phytotoxic to a range of plants by inhibiting the 
EPSPS protein, which leads to biosynthesis of key amino acids, leading to plant death. 
The mEPSPS protein is not inhibited by glyphosate and still performs the necessary 
EPSPS function in maize, thereby rendering the plant resistant to the herbicide. 
GA21 will be used for food and feed, and the application to EFSA on 16 July 2008 
included permission for import, processing and cultivation (it had already been approved 
for import on March 28 2008 from an application submitted on July 29 2005). 
3.3.1 History of the GA21 Application Process 
On July 12 2008, EFSA received from the United Kingdom CA the application for 
authorization of genetically modified GA21 maize made by Syngenta Seeds. The scope of 
the application was to include cultivation in Europe. The application was made available to 
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member states by EFSA on 4 August 2008. EFSA also began to evaluate completion of 
the application. EFSA decided the application was valid as of 21 October 2008 and 
“started the clock” on the process. From this point, EFSA endeavoured to keep the 
application process to 6 months, and gave member state competent authorities and risk 
assessment bodies 3 months after receipt of application to make their opinion known. 
From 3 February 2009 to 21 December 2009 (227 working days) EFSA stopped the clock 
to request additional information. It stopped the clock again on 12 January 2010 to 19 
October 2010 (202 working days); and again from 26 October 2010 to 29 November 2011 
(286 working days). The overall time delay or “clock stop” was 715 working days. 
3.3.2 Technical dossier Appendix 28 Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) 
Syngenta submitted an environmental risk assessment, structured according to the 
Scientific Panel of Genetically Modified Organisms and following the principle of Directive 
2001/18/EC. The Appendix submitted by Syngenta lays out the principle they adhere to 
for risk assessment, which is “tiered assessment” that offers an “efficient and effective” 
means of assessing risk from GM crops.  
The document states that confidence lies in the rigour of hypothesis testing, and further 
studies should not simply add data but rather add to the rigour of previous studies. Further 
studies are only required if the rigour of those initially conducted does not satisfactorily 
provide evidence of low risk. This question of what constitutes rigour in methodology and 
conclusion framing will be noted as an issue below. 
Syngenta’s evidence to determine the potential environmental impact of GA21 is based 
on comparative testing with non-GM maize and noting the difference. Syngenta assumes 
that the impact of conventional maize cultivation is considered to be acceptable and that 
GA21 will be non-harmful because its characteristics closely match non-GM maize. In 
addition to the comparative assessment, numerous safety studies were performed to 
illustrate that the expression of the protein is highly unlikely to be toxic or allergenic.  
Risk assessment 1: Likelihood of GM crop becoming more persistent 
Syngenta presented data about non-GM maize to argue that maize in general is not likely 
to become persistent in the natural environment, and that deliberate cultivation is needed 
for its survivability. The structure of domesticated maize makes it difficult to self-germinate 
and survive, and the introduction of the GA21 event is very unlikely to cause maize to 
regress to its primitive form (which would be able to germinate and thrive in the natural 
environment – regression would involve significant changes in the plant). Furthermore, the 
mEPSPS protein expressed in GA21 containing maize only provides tolerance to 
glyphosate, which would provide no advantage, except in the presence of glyphosate and 
therefore should not make it more durable in the wild or areas where glyphosate is not 
used.  
Risk assessment 2: Selective advantage 
GA21 has no selective advantage when glyphosate is not used. 
Risk assessment 3: Gene transfer to other sexually compatible species 
Syngenta states that the only species that might be sexually compatible and hybridize 
with GA21 are not present in Europe, and likelihood of gene flow to wild relatives is 
therefore negligible. GA21 can cross-fertilize with other maize, but maize pollen is heavy 
and therefore 98% of pollen falls within 25-50 metres radius of the source. Considering 
possible wind variations and other factors, Syngenta has projected that 200 metres is 
sufficient to maintain 99.9% purity with other maize varieties in the vicinity of a GA21 crop. 
These figures relate to field trials and the safety margins necessary for these trials. In 
terms of commercial application, the assumption is made that there will be a degree of 
cross-pollination due to different risk management practices; this also raises the standard 
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of safety as regarding the crop itself as any conclusions carry this assumption of cross-
pollination.  
Risk assessment 4: Target organisms 
There are no target organisms. GA21’s target is glyphosate rather than an organism that 
may interact with the crop. 
Risk assessment 5: Possible effect on non-target organisms 
Syngenta believes that GA21 is unlikely to be different in its effects on non-target 
organisms from non-GM maize. The Shikimate pathway of EPSPS is not present in 
animals, and for plants mEPSPS is 99.3% identical to EPSPS which is ubiquitous in 
plants, therefore toxicity is very unlikely. 
Risk assessment 6: Effect on humans 
Based on the mEPSPS structure, and the genome pathway, the hypothesis is that GA21 
would have little effect on humans beyond a normal maize effect. This was tested for 
acute toxicity in mice, with no noted effects. This was corroborated by a number of 
studies.  
Risk assessment 7: Delayed effects on animal health? 
Again, because of its similarity to non-GM maize, there will likely be little effect. It has also 
been tested on rats and poultry. 
Risk assessment 8: Delayed impacts on environment? 
EPSPS is ubiquitous in soil and microbes, the negligible possibility of gene transfer from 
GM plants to bacteria would still likely not be harmful because of similarity to EPSPS. 
Risk assessment 9: Cultivation effects 
Using rotation of crops and crop management systems (i.e. herbicide) should be able to 
control for adverse bio-diversity or troublesome plant effects. Syngenta argues that there 
would be no real difference from other maize agriculture. 
3.3.3 Czech Republic assessment 
On 1 August 2008, EFSA requested the Ministry of the Environment of the Czech 
Republic to carry out the environmental assessment, which the Czech government 
confirmed on 8 October 2008. EFSA requested the Czech authority to be finished by 4 
months after the 21 October date; in the course of reviewing Syngenta’s material, the 
Czech Republic identified in two rounds of review the need for additional information from 
Syngenta.  
On 16 January 2009, the Czech authority formulated a set of questions and requested 
provision of information from Syngenta. The clock was stopped on 3 February 2009. The 
requested information mostly revolved around the change in agricultural practices; 
information relating to the GM plant; potential change in how the plant interacts with the 
environment resulting from its genetic modification; chemical use and the essential 
monitoring plan. 
Syngenta replied on 14 July 2009; the Czech authority evaluated the new data and 
decided that further clarification was needed, and requested for the clock to remain 
stopped. The extra information requested related to information about herbicide use, 
regarding data from field trials and the method of statistical analysis for comparison from 
at minimum three European localities regarding cultivation, management and harvesting. 
This second set raises the question as to what kind of data should have initially been used 
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to avoid a second request for further data9. They also requested farmer questionnaires to 
be reviewed. The extra information was received from Syngenta on the 27 October 2009. 
Data were delivered on field trials from three different regions; the results showed wide 
variations per locality with the field trials and question arose as to whether the field trials 
were properly carried out. According to Syngenta the field trials carried out were not 
designed to answer the question that was specifically being asked by the Czech CA 
because herbicide registration was not part of the scope of the Biotech dossier and hence 
herbicide efficacy data should not be required; the Czech CA focused on the effects of the 
herbicide used in conjunction with GA21. The herbicide, however, falls under different EU 
regulation, but the Czech CA wanted to get this information from the data, which were not 
required in GM studies, rather than from the herbicide dossier. The Czech authority did 
not expect the applicant to be able to provide further information or provide data 
correcting the field trials to address concerns regarding the herbicide and therefore asked 
EFSA to restart the clock and began to prepare its report based on the data available (i.e. 
that they could not exclude the possibility of adverse environmental effects based on field 
trials). EFSA, however, stopped the clock again on 16 February 2010 and requested more 
information from Syngenta.  
A new set of questions was submitted, and on 21 July 2010 Syngenta delivered an 
information package that included studies on non-target organisms, field trials, and 
additional comments on surveillance of crops. The Czech authority deemed this sufficient 
and on 12 October 2010 restarted the clock, and submitted their final report on 20 
October 2010. 
The Czech authority’s assessment went through the following different points, the 
numbering used below corresponding to the numbering used by the Czech authority in 
their submitted report. 
6.1.Genetic modification – just a note regarding this, no major contestation 
6.2 GM Plant traits – noted that any differences between GM and non-GM fell 
within normal biological variation. No real biologically significant difference 
between GA21 and non-GM maize besides increased tolerance to herbicide. 
7.1. Persistence or invasiveness – no real difference to non-GM. 
7.2 Selective advantage/disadvantage – no real advantage except when 
glyphosate used 
7.3 Potential for gene transfer – extremely low to plants and animals 
7.5 Interaction between GM plant to non-target organism – the main impact not 
from GA21 but from changes in use of herbicide which could affect biodiversity as 
would be the case in conventional agriculture. 
7.6 Health – no effect 
7.8 Impact of cultivation – here the Czech authority disagreed with Syngenta 
stating that there should be management techniques designed for GA21 cultivation 
because of potential effect of glyphosate use/over-use on biodiversity. It is worth 
noting that biodiversity is not defined in EU regulation; regulators instead wait to 
see the results of studies and then determine whether more information can be 
obtained based on that. This raises the question as to where responsibility lies 
                                                
9 Assessing chemical use as part of the biotech dossier would put a company in a difficult position 
as this information was not part of the scope of the dossier and would amount to use of field trial 
data in a manner for which it was not designed. This point also relates to the different approaches 
taken by the CA and EFSA.  
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regarding farming practices and the use of an herbicide in conjunction with a crop. 
It also raises the more fundamental question as to what needs to be assessed as 
part of the GM-crop registration versus what needs to be assessed as part of the 
herbicide registration. Does Syngenta bear this responsibility, the individual 
farmer, or the member states where the practices are carried out? 
8.1 Case specific monitoring – because of change in herbicide use, the Czech CA 
believes it necessary to monitor potential environmental changes which may be 
immediate or delayed on biodiversity; the CA believes there is a need to focus on 
weed shifts, development of plant resistance to glyphosate, non-target organisms, 
and microbial biodiversity. The focus on weed shifts raises the question as to 
which weed shifts are harmful and which are simply different; these aspects are 
again not defined and risk assessment studies can simply turn into scientific 
research into the ecological effects of glyphosate. 
8.2 General surveillance – Czech authority believes that it is not clear how 
monitoring will be carried out integrating the different data sources used.  
Overall conclusion of environmental risk 
The Czech CA concluded that Syngenta would need to include a greater description of 
case specific monitoring, improved general monitoring, and to design a user guide for 
farmers using glyphosate. The position taken by the Czech CA on where responsibility 
lies regarding farming practices seems to be that, at least to a degree, some of that 
responsibility lies with Syngenta.   
3.3.4 Question Packages submitted to Syngenta 
Czech question set 1 (4 questions): 
Question 1 is notable because it states that section 9.1 of the Syngenta application is too 
simplified and general and requests specification of “all possible interaction and factors 
that may be considered (comparison to teosinte, rodents and birds) and to take also into 
account spreading of grains by humans”. This statement in the question raises the issues 
of what exactly is asked for to determine what information should be submitted. 
Question 2 is notable because it states that section 9.3 under Syngenta’s discussion on 
gene transfer, there is no discussion of its effect on animals and requests such 
information on animals including microbes/bacteria. Interestingly, this is briefly covered 
(and repeated in the response to the question) in the subsequent section 9.8 of 
Syngenta’s application. Did the Czech authority miss this? 
Questions 3 and 4 begin to raise the two issues that are upheld by EFSA in the final 
report – a greater degree of detail regarding farming practices and the use of glyphosate 
in terms of its managed use, and a more detailed/improved description of general 
surveillance of the GM plant in terms of approach, strategy, method and analysis. 
EFSA Question set 1 (6 questions): 
The questions put forward to Syngenta directly from EFSA were mostly requests for 
further data and justification of data. Syngenta’s responses seemed mostly to provide 
data already gathered from past studies on the particular topic areas. This latter point 
raises the question of whether this information had already been provided in the package 
but not read by the authority, or whether the references to these studies were clear 
enough that the authority could note them; it also raises the question of whether these 
data should have been provided as part of the package. 
Czech question set 2 (2 questions) 
Same as above. 
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EFSA question set 2 ( 3 questions) 
Set of questions requiring more data and more detailed data sets. For example, the first 
asks for data on all mEPSPS expression, the second asks for a review of all new scientific 
data since the last EFSA GMO Panel on GA 21 in 2007, and on non-lethal toxicity effects 
of GA21. 
Table 2. Questions from other national authorities (Appendix G of dossier) 
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Austria 25 0 2 5 18 
Belgium 4 2 0 0 2 
Finland 1 0 0 1 0 
Germany 31 3 2 8 18 
Hungary 2 0 0 2 0 
Ireland 2 0 0 2 0 
Italy 1 0 0 1 0 
Norway 6 1 1 3 1 
Spain 2 1 0 0 1 
Sweden 4 2 0 0 2 
Netherlands 2 0 0 1 1 
UK 4 1 0 3 0 
Total 84 10 5 26 43 
 
The total number of questions/statements submitted by member states over the “3 month” 
period was 84. Of those 84 questions/statements: 10 were simply statements referring to 
other studies or data the member CA thought relevant in its analysis or which it thought 
Syngenta and/or EFSA should be aware of; 5 were simply negative statements 
disagreeing with some element of Syngenta’s submission; 26 were questions/or 
statements requesting more data or clarification, delivered in a neutral tone (i.e. not 
questioning the relevance of Syngenta’s study, but asking for more information beyond 
that submitted); 43 directly questioned the relevance or appropriateness of Syngenta’s 
studies or of its conclusions based on the study descriptions/data submitted. 
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The overwhelming majority of questions challenged the relevance or appropriateness of 
Syngenta’s studies. As mentioned earlier, Syngenta’s approach to putting together its 
application package is to limit the number of new studies it must carry out by relying on 
the rigour, relevance and appropriateness of studies already conducted, explaining its 
conclusions based on this, and only adding further data in areas where relevance or 
appropriateness might be challenged.  
Of further note is that the majority of questions/statements challenging the relevance of 
studies in the application package come from two member states: Austria and Germany, 
with 18 of these questions/statements each. Each of these countries have demonstrated a 
normative opposition to GM crops in the political realm (Levidow 2005). Each of the 
member state questions must be addressed by EFSA agreeing with the utility of the 
question and passing it on to Syngenta for further data, or addressing the question by 
either citing other data or studies that answer the question, or explaining why the question 
is not suitable for further consideration. 
It is also interesting to note that all member countries except Germany had only one 
national competent authority respond to the submission. In Germany, two authorities 
responded: the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation, and the Federal Office of 
Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL). In two instances, the German agencies 
disagreed with each other on a specific aspect of the submission. In this case only body 
(BVL) is the competent authority, the other agency (Nature Conservation) is not. 
In the first of these instances of disagreement, the Federal Agency for Nature 
Conservation stated: “An exposure analysis as well as any experiment addressing the 
ecotoxicity of GA21 on non-target organisms is missing. Since no data on the ecotoxicity 
of the whole GMO including the expressed proteins were submitted risks cannot be fully 
assessed and the dossier does not meet the requirements...” (note, this is responded to 
directly by EFSA, as described below). The BVL, however, states “The German CA is of 
the opinion that, in the case of maize event GA21, the assessment of potential risks to 
non-target organisms can be completed without the performance of first tier tests. The 
assessment which leads the applicant to the conclusion that effects on non-target 
organisms arising from the cultivation of GA21 are highly unlikely is comprehensible and 
scientifically sound,” (emphasis added).  
In the second instance, the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation disagreed with 
Syngenta’s statement that case specific monitoring resulting from GA21 is not necessary, 
and believes that such case monitoring should cover the occurrence of glyphosate 
resistant weeds. The BVL, however, states “the applicant concluded there is no need for a 
case specific monitoring based on the results of the risk assessment. The German CA 
agrees with this conclusion.” 
Interestingly, many of EFSA’s responses agreed with Syngenta’s conclusions, pushing 
back against member CA challenges, though EFSA does agree in some instances and 
notes a request made for further data or clarification. An illustrative example of a response 
from EFSA to the Austrian CA “notes that the approach applied in the comparative 
analysis is in line with its Guidance Document, which was in place at the time the 
application was submitted”. Also illustrative is a response by EFSA to a question by 
Germany’s Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (see first statement noted above): 
“testing of non-target organisms without a sound hypothesis would add little to the overall 
risk assessment.” EFSA’s responses seem to be split between asking for all the data 
available within particular areas, mostly in terms of specific studies already conducted, 
and accepting that previous approval has occurred (therefore a previous study cited was 
sufficient). EFSA seems to be attempting to remain scientific and objective, but no 
parameters are set on what is necessary to demonstrate safety. For the most part, EFSA 
accepts the hypotheses that Syngenta puts forward (i.e. justifying why maize behaves a 
certain way), but also asks in some instances for all data backing the hypotheses.  
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The most common or strongest concerns were those expressed in the final report – 
namely the requirement for a clarified monitoring program and a more specified farmer 
questionnaire. This implies that EFSA to some extent tries to determine the common 
concern to highlight key changes, but this is not necessarily clear. Also, one might ask if 
this outcome could have been reached in a faster, more targeted process.  
Given that EFSA assigned the environmental review to the Czech Authority, which did not 
demonstrate hostility to Syngenta’s proposal, it is implied that the whole process would 
have been very different if a different authority had been selected for the environmental 
assessment, particularly given the above differences in opinion amongst the CAs, 
including between the German authorities. How does EFSA determine which CA to assign 
to the task? Are the national authorities given data from previous submissions? How 
much are national authorities expected to be experts and have access to knowledge of 
studies on the different areas? There is some indication that this selection is based on 
willingness and available expertise in the member countries, leaving EFSA with a limited 
pool of candidates. More information on this from EFSA itself would be useful. 
3.4 Discussion and Conclusions  
The Bt11 and GA21 case studies highlight the challenges facing industry in getting GMO 
products approved for cultivation in the EU. They are also illustrative of the widening gaps 
between risk assessment, scientific evidence and policymaking. Our discussions with 
Syngenta and review of the literature regarding Bt11 and GA21 specifically, and 
regulation more generally, revealed a number of key issues. 
In both case studies it was clear that the political constraints placed on EFSA have so far 
made it virtually impossible for their positive scientific opinions about GM crop 
development in the EU to be followed through in practice. In terms of the general role of 
EFSA, it often receives reference questions on points it has already answered, but instead 
of simply stating that the question has been answered, EFSA sometimes feels it is 
necessary to collect more information and demand additional data. EFSA has always 
done what is requested of it from the Commission (reanalyse the product, for example, 
which happened with Bt11), and this always takes time. In the case of GA21, the 
assessment process split between the more normative “this is not enough data to base 
your conclusions” or “this is not a rigorous enough study” and the “I understand and agree 
with this data, however what can you tell us about this?” What needs to be determined, 
therefore, is what are enough data and what are the requirements or criteria for relevance 
for these studies. 
This debate about the nature and meaning of data and requests for clarification or further 
studies requires a lot of work and causes significant delays in the approval process. One 
could argue that risk-assessment and regulation should require additional information/ 
data collection only when there is a clear, legitimate and demonstrable need for it. This 
perhaps requires a clearer demarcation between risk-assessment and scientific research, 
as discussed in more detail below. 
Second, EFSA and many CA’s, as well as a number of NGOs, do not appear to fully 
recognise the distinction between the science of risk-assessment and scientific research 
itself. For risk-assessment, a decision can be taken on the basis of a limited amount of 
research determined by what needs to be known to satisfy regulatory standards, whereas 
requests for more scientific research in the cases described here often seemed to be 
generated more in the spirit of open inquiry (nice-to-know). Limiting the data requirement 
to that needed for a decision also allows for a fixed time line. The initial scientific opinion 
of EFSA on Bt11 in 2005, for instance, should have represented an endpoint in regulatory 
decision-making, if risk-assessment was the primary objective. However, since Bt11 has 
now been in the system for 17 years without a final decision, this has clearly moved 
beyond a risk-assessment process, according to a number of our interviewees. The same 
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can be said for GA21. The data that are important to know in order to make an informed 
decision on the safety/efficacy of these products must be better distinguished from the 
wealth of data on the products that might be scientifically interesting, but have no direct 
relevance to risk-assessment. Within Syngenta, only studies that produce data relevant to 
answering specific questions from regulators are conducted and submitted as part of the 
regulatory dossier. Furthermore, Syngenta only uses methodologies that are tried and 
tested (adhere to international protocols, follow GLP standards etc) and where there is 
some consensus about their validity.  
One challenge for EFSA is to establish what the relevant questions to be answered are. 
One of our interviewees claimed that EFSA often asks companies to go beyond 
established methodologies to further explore the science, which makes it difficult to 
assess reliability of results and represents a move away from risk-assessment to scientific 
curiosity. EFSA published some guidance on risk assessment methodology in 2004, but 
since then the goalposts have constantly been moving, particularly arising from a 
mandate from the Commission that unintended, long-term effects should be part of the 
risk-assessment for cultivation.  
Thirdly, the political process appears to be more restrictive than the regulatory process. 
Regulation can be long and complicated but should, if done correctly, produce an 
outcome. In the cases of Bt11 and GA21, the political process remains a total barrier to 
introduction of these products in the EU implying, as described by Syngenta staff, that the 
problems lie with risk management rather than risk assessment.  
Finally, both case study products have already been cultivated in many countries, with no 
reports of adverse effects. This is important, indicating an absence of harm for both 
products, but once again raising the question, what constitutes sufficient evidence of 
safety. Formally, risk assessments test hypotheses that a particular use of a particular 
product will not cause specified harmful effects. A "negative result" is corroboration of one 
or more of these hypotheses. The amount of evidence someone requests will be linked to 
the degree of corroboration they require for the hypothesis of no harm. Some people 
prefer a single severe test of the hypothesis (a tier 1 study, for example), while others 
prefer a huge weight of evidence from studies that may only weakly test the hypothesis (if 
at all). Given that the best we can achieve is corroboration, not proof, of the hypothesis a 
case can always be made for further testing. This implies that GM applications face (i) a 
set of normative positions attempting to block the process of approval, and (ii) a lack of 
parameters specifying what are sufficient data and what issues should be placed on the 
table, thereby potentially extending the process indefinitely.  
Levidow et al (2005), in their study of EU regulation of GM, describe how CAs will assess 
evidence and either request more information or state that the evidence is sufficient. 
However, where one CA finds evidence sufficient, many times other CAs raise objections 
and given such disagreements, including on standards for control measures for use, 
EFSA has been asked to make its own judgements. In our cases this applies to many of 
EFSA’s responses where decisions can be seen as accepting weak evidence or 
anomalous results. 
The standards for evidence or justification for opposing GM approval are thus not 
specified and many member state CAs do not provide reasons for withholding support of 
GM products. EuropaBio, in a short report (3 June, 2013) has noted that “the Commission 
has formally admitted that it regularly fails to comply with legal timelines when it comes to 
GM authorizations,” (pg. 1). In a March 2013 report, EuropaBio notes that for applications 
for food/feed/import – not cultivation – the average time for approval for a GM product is 
45 months (rather than 6), and 15 months (i.e. one third of the time) is spent after the 
completion of the EFSA risk assessment. For those applications that include cultivation 
the wait is far longer. EuropaBio notes that on different occasions EC panel meetings on 
GM crops have been cancelled. According to how the authorization process is supposed 
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to work, if EFSA finds an application satisfactory the Commission then votes on whether 
to approve the product; if a qualified majority of member states is not achieved, a second 
vote is held. If again a qualified majority is not achieved, the Commission can approve the 
product (EuropaBio, March 2013); however participants in the process have speculated 
that, due to the sensitive nature of GM products in Europe, the EC is unwilling to move 
forward without a qualified majority.  
In conclusion, the Bt11 and GA21 case studies illustrate the risk-assessment policy gap, 
and the continued blurring of the boundaries between risk assessment, scientific research 
and policy-making. They also illustrate the more general lack of political willingness to 
approve GM products for cultivation in the EU.  
3.5 Letter from EFB to European Commissioner Stavros Dimas10 
Dear Commissioner Dimas,  
The European Federation of Biotechnology, EFB, is very concerned to read about your 
draft decisions to reject two Bt maize product submissions based on discredited scientific 
arguments that have not been reviewed by your own independent scientific body, the 
European Food Safety Authority.  
We consider that the draft decisions do not have a scientific basis and seem to be made 
without considering the consequences for Europe or the fact that similar varieties have 
been growing in Europe for the past 9 years with high adoption rates with no adverse 
environmental effects and in coexistence with conventional and organic farming.  
Concerning the scientific studies contained in your draft decisions, that claim to 
demonstrate environmental risks presented by Bt maize, nine out of the eleven 
publications actually confirm the environmental safety of Bt maize cultivation and in fact 
do not identify any environmental risk with respect to the cultivation of Bt maize in the EU.  
Only two of these publications (Hilbeck et al., 2006, & Rosi-Marshall et al., 2007) allege 
potential environmental risks; the former being a philosophical approach, rather than 
scientific data, and the latter is a questionable extrapolation from laboratory tests. Indeed 
the Rosi-Marshall et al. paper is based solely on laboratory experiments, whereas the field 
data of the same authors demonstrates no Bt effect on aquatic organisms (as shown on 
their own website). As far as the field test is concerned, it lacks decisive data on which 
transgenic maize plants were used and the entire experimental documentation appears 
sloppy and not meriting peer reviewed publication1. In contrast to the theoretical risk 
projections of Hilbeck, other authors have published a meta-analysis, of all available 
studies carried out with Bt crops based on real, scientifically acquired data that confirm 
there is no indication of ecological risk arising from the cultivation of Bt maize (Marvier et 
al., 2007; Romeis et al., 2007). There is no new scientific evidence to contradict the 
conclusions reached by the GMO Panel of the EFSA on the safety of Bt maize cultivation 
in the EU. Furthermore, in July 2007, the OECD published a consensus document 2 on 
safety information of transgenic plants expressing Bt.  
This document thoroughly reviews and confirms the safety and high degree of specificity 
of the Bt proteins expressed in Bt maize, including the protein expressed in line 1507.  
Another inconsistency of your draft decisions is that they fail to draw on a substantial body 
of scientific data accumulated over several years and published in the last 12 months that 
highlight the economic, environmental and consumer benefits of Bt maize. A total of 63 
peer-reviewed publications attest to the fact that Bt toxin does not accumulate in the soil 
and does not affect aerial and soil-based non-target organisms, on the contrary, there is 
                                                
10 The documentary references included in this paper are not referenced here. 
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ample evidence that non-target insects are severely threatened and reduced in their 
populations by spraying pesticides.  
In considering the environmental safety of Bt maize, it is pertinent to note that Bacillus 
thuringiensis has been widely used as an insecticide spray for the control of European 
corn borer in Europe since 1938, when the first commercial Bt preparation (Sporeine) 
came onto the market in France. Given that Bt is a commonly used insecticide in organic 
agriculture and given the current trend in the expansion of organic farming in Europe, and 
the year-on-year northward spread of European corn borer, it is inevitable that Bt spraying 
will be on the increase. The scientific data accumulated over recent years as part of 
biosafety assessment dossiers compiled on the various Bt crop varieties for commercial 
release will provide useful evidence for assessing the environmental impact of organic 
farming. As for the present time these environmental assessments of Bt sprays with their 
much higher concentrations have not been properly carried through, and also not 
published in peer reviewed journals - this in contrast to the many peer reviewed papers 
testifying no negative effects in soil and agricultural environment of GM Bt crops.  
Agriculture is vital to the European economy, and Europe stands to gain much by the 
cultivation of new high performance crop varieties. Bt maize ensures productivity in years 
of heavy infestations and reduces the need for pesticides. In 2006, GM maize varieties 
including these two products were planted on 25.2 million hectares around the globe, and 
on 62,187 hectares in Europe. Spain has grown Bt maize for 9 years, and the benefits of 
Bt maize to Spanish farmers are well documented: average yield benefits have often been 
10% and sometimes higher, which adds 15 million Euros income to Spanish growers. 
Recent field trials in Italy showed that Bt maize performed better than conventional 
varieties with yield increases of between 28 and 43 percent. These trials demonstrated 
that Bt maize can not only be more profitable for farmers, but is healthier because of lower 
contamination with hazardous fungal mycotoxins which represent a significant health 
threat to humans and animals when present in the food chain (Regulation (EC) No 
1881/2006).  
Farming systems are very diverse, from conventional to organic or genetically modified 
(GM). This ensures that agriculture provides an abundant and affordable supply of healthy 
food and feed, and offers consumers more choice. The EU's explicit policy is that 'No form 
of Agriculture should be excluded from the Union', and the European Commission asks 
Member States to develop rules for the coexistence of different production systems, like 
Bt maize and non-GM maize, all long term scientific coexistence studies on maize 
demonstrate the feasibility of coexistence. It is important that the consequences of any 
obstacles to the cultivation of GM maize varieties such as these are carefully evaluated, 
since a number of alarming indicators point to a future collapse of the EU livestock 
production due to the unavailability of imported feedstuffs.  
The Portuguese Council Presidency has recently called for an open debate on the impact 
of the EU GM policy on food and feed security, in the light of an extra cost of 2 Bio Euros 
for EU-livestock producers resulting from de-facto import bans on feed maize and corn 
gluten feed from GM corn producing countries.  
The draft Commission Decisions are totally unacceptable, not only for European farmers 
and consumers, but also set a terrible example for other parts of the world that presently 
draft guidelines for the cultivation of GM crops, since they look to Europe as an example. 
This is especially true in the developing world where there is an urgent need of new 
technologies to raise agricultural productivity. Other GM strains of maize are under 
development that will have enhanced nutritional quality or tolerance to drought, and must 
be given the chance to reach those who need them the most. It is a proven fact that in 
developing countries Bt maize is healthier due to its much lower content of mycotoxins, 
which have dramatic detrimental effect on human health (cancer, spina bifidis). 
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In conclusion, Commissioner, your proposals to not approve the two Bt maize lines for 
cultivation based on discredited scientific arguments would not only undermine the EU's 
own scientific advice and risk assessment procedure but would also represent a 
significant threat to the competitiveness of European farmers.  
To impose such bans is economically wrong, and pesticide use for controlling European 
corn borer would continue, It is also wrong on grounds of human health considerations. 
European farmers would be denied a valuable economic choice and Europe would import 
more grain to meet demand, but from where. It would do nothing to support the choice of 
feed producers or consumers. Such a move would violate EU procedures and without 
scientific evidence to support them would ultimately be rejected.  
As European scientists we urge you to reconsider and return to a reasoning based on 
science and experience. The consequences of approving these draft Decisions and the 
precedents they would set would be the marginalisation of science in Europe, the 
discrediting of the European Food Safety Authority and the collapse of the EU-livestock 
industry.  
Yours sincerely, 
 
Emeritus Professor Marc Van Montagu 
President of the European Federation of Biotechnology 
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